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INTRODUCTION

Although the fourth amendment has been with us for a long
2
time,' its interpretation by the courts, with one notable exception,
commenced in earnest with the advent of the twentieth century.
As with any constitutional enactment, it could be safely assumed
that the amendment would present two types of problems. In the
first place, there would be the problem of interpretation. Secondly, there would be the problem of applicability.
The first type of problem, as exemplified by the question,
"What does the amendment mean?", has generated little controversy, because the Supreme Court has been remarkably consistent
in its interpretation of the basic purpose of the amendment.8 Naturally, once the purpose is understood, the problem of meaning
will be resolved.
The problem of applicability has been more difficult of resolution. This problem has itself fallen into two categories. The
first category dealt with what might be called, for lack of a better
term, "governmental applicability." What primarily gave rise to
this category was the Weeks exclusionary rule, 4 which stated that
in federal criminal prosecutions, evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment would be excluded. Because Weeks limited the exclusion to the federal government, 5 a thicket of problems
vis-A-vis federal-state relations arose. An analysis of these problems being beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that
the difficulties inherent in "governmental applicability" were put
to rest in Mapp v. Ohio,6 which extended the Weeks exclusionary
rule to the states.
The second category of applicability is the one that has never
been satisfactorily resolved by the Supreme Court, and, consequently, has become a problem of growing intensity. This category
may be termed "functional applicability," and is concerned with a
determination of whether certain conduct of law enforcement officers is forbidden by the amendment. Implicit herein is the meaning or concept of "search" under the fourth amendment; for if the
conduct complained of does not amount to a search for fourth1. It was adopted in 1791. United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952, 956
(N.D.N.Y. 1929).
2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
3. Standing at the "core" of the amendment is the security of the
individual's "privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police." Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Accord, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 635 (1886); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 455 (1948); cf. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961).
4. Although first announced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
391-93 (1914), it had been clearly forewarned in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 at 633, 638 (1886).
5. Weeks v. United States, supra note 4, at 398.
6. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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amendment purposes, then there is nothing upon which the amendment can act. 7 It is to this category that this article shall be directed, with particular emphasis upon the function of observation
in the law of search and seizure. An examination will also be
made of the role of visual aids, which have become a necessary
adjunct to functional observation.'
Before proceeding to an analysis of the meaning of "search"
under the amendment, as well as an analysis of the cases that have
passed upon the issue of functional observation, certain principles
must be discussed. A detailed statement of the protective rules
surrounding the law of search and seizure, as well as the law of
arrest, is necessary to familiarize the reader with the stringent requirements for constitutional searches in order that he may better
understand why so many courts have been reluctant to characterize
functional observations as searches.
I. THE

ROLE OF "TREsPASS" IN THE LAW OF SEARCH & SEIZURE

The first of these deals with the role of "trespass" in the law
of search and seizure. Historically, the command of the fourth
amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures 0 has been
bottomed on the premise embodied in the ancient maxim that a
man's house is his castle."' Since the common law had yet to be
exposed to invasions of privacy not effected by physical intrusions,
it was natural for eighteenth-century thinking to be exclusively
concerned with trespasses in determining whether the maxim had
been violated. Thus, at an early date the maxim came into play in
England to protect the individual in his home from the odious gen7. See State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 43, 395 P.2d 535, 537 (1964).
8. A recent study by the Vera Institute for Justice of the arrest
"flow" in Manhattan over a period of 31 months has revealed that the
rate of arrests is highest from 8 P.M. to 4 A.M. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1966,
p. 30, col. 3.

See also,

SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF SEARCH

& SEIZURE 63 (Kings County Crim. Bar Asso. 1964).
9. Although it is somewhat difficult to determine the exact meaning
of trespass in search and seizure cases, it certainly is not a concept controlled by local real property law. E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961), wherein the court refused to consider whether the use
of a "spike mike" constituted "a technical trespass under the local property
law relating to party walls." The closest the court has come to defining
"trespass" for fourth amendment purposes is to equate it with an actual
physical invasion or intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. 365
U.S. at 509-10, 512; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
Thus, for a trespass to arise under the amendment, two facts must be established. First, the activity complained of involved a physical or actual
intrusion. Second, the intrusion was into a place or area protected under
the amendment. Therefore, in referring to trespass in this article, the concept intended will be that developed by the Supreme Court.
10. E.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1961); Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947).
11. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). See also, Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
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eral warrant. 12 In the celebrated case of Entick v. Carrington,1
Lord Camden inveighed against the use of the general warrant to
search among a man's private papers for seditious libel. 14 But, as
pointed out in Boyd v. United States,15 a trespass committed in the
execution of a general search warrant for seditious libel did not
constitute the essence of the offense of unreasonable invasion of
privacy. Rather, such breaking and entering, and such rummaging
of the individual's papers, were circumstances of aggravation."6
Viewed in this light, it is seen that an invasion of privacy is
not limited to a trespassory intrusion. The element of trespass will
aggravate the invasion, but it will neither limit nor define it. Once
this differentiation is recognized, then, and only then, is the concept of search released from the limiting bondage of physical intrusion. In short, with the element of trespass relegated to a secondary role of importance, a search for fourth-amendment
purposes
17
need no longer be limited to a physical intrusion.
Unfortunately, although the Court thus appeared to recognize
the secondary rule of trespass in the law of search and seizure, it
has not seen fit to continue this approach. Thus, when first presented with the twentieth-century problem of wire-tapping in Olinstead v. United States, it ruled that because the taps complained of
had not been accomplished by an actual intrusion, there was no
12. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765).
13. 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029
(C.P. 1765).
14. 19 Howell's St. Tr. at 1064-1074.
15. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
16. The principles laid down in this opinion [Entick v. Carrington]
affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They
reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the
court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking
of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes
the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property,
where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some
public offence,-it is the invasion of this sacred right which under'-

lies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. Break-

ing into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances
of aggravation....
116 U.S. at 630. (Emphasis supplied.)
17. For a similar interpretation of Boyd, see LANDYNSKI, SEARcH
AND

SEIZURE

AND THE

SUPREME COURT:

A STUDY

IN CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION 52-53 (1966), wherein the author interpreted Mr. Justice
Bradley's opinion in Boyd as meaning that the fourth amendment "did not
merely protect against actual searches, but also against other procedures,
or figurative searches, which sought to accomplish the objects of a search
without affording the constitutional safeguards surrounding it." (Emphasis supplied.) Whether it be called a "figurative" search, as distinguished
from an "actual" search, is of no import. What is important is that the
language used is sufficiently broad to condemn any unreasonable invasion
of privacy by governmental action, whether accompanied by a trespass
or not.
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search for fourth-amendment purposes. 8 And in Goldman v. United
states,'9 it held that the placing of a detectaphone against an office
wall, without causing an actual intrusion did no violence to the
amendment. 20 On the other hand, in Silverman v. United States,2 '
the Court ruled that penetration into a protected area by means of a
"spike mike" was prohibited. 22 In a concurring opinion, which was
more in the nature of a biting dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas put in
proper perspective the continued irrelevant emphasis upon the requirement of a trespass. As he said:
My trouble with stare decisis in this field is that it leads us
to a matching of cases on irrelevant facts. An electronic
device on the outside wall of a house is a permissible invasion of privacy according to Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129, while an electronic device that penetrates the
wall, as here is not. Yet the invasion of privacy is as great
in one case as in the other. The concept of 'an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises,' on which
the present decision rests, seems to me to be beside the
point. Was not the wrong in both cases done when the
intimacies of the home were tapped, recorded, or revealed?
The depth of the penetration of the electronic deviceeven the degree of its remoteness from the inside of the
house-is not the measure of the injury. There is in each
such case a search that should be made, if at all, only on a
warrant issued by a magistrate. . .

Our concern should

not be with the trivialities of the local law of trespass, as
the opinion of the Court indicates. But neither should the
command of the FourthAmendment be limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind of electronic equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should
be with whether
the privacy of the home was invaded.23
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464-67 (1928).
19. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
20. 316 U.S. at 135.
21. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
22. 365 U.S. at 509-12.
23. 365 U.S. at 512-13. (Emphasis supplied.)
For favorable comment on this penetrating analysis, see Notes and Comments, 40 N.C.
L. REV. 115, 117-18 (1961), observing that the significance of Silverman
lay in the fact that the court based its ruling on the physical intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area, and not on a technical trespass
under property law, Id. at 115; Decisions, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 151, 153
(1961); Note, 12 AM. U. L. REV. 83, 85-86 (1963).
One further observation would appear to be in order. As noted, Boyd

and Silverman were discussing the privacy of the home, which, of course,
is protected.

Lewis v. United States, 87 Sup. Ct. 424, 427 (1966).

amendment's protection is not limited solely to a residence.

The

It has been

declared to apply as well to the following places and things, among
others: An office, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); a place
of business, State v. Burrachio, 39 N.J. 272, 188 A.2d 401, 402 (1963); a
store, Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-17 (1921); Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582, 591, 593 (1946); a hotel room, Johnson v. United
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Thus, without re-examining Olmstead the Court has reduced
its requirement of entry to a simple physical intrusion or penetration, however slight. But the Court has not overruled Olmstead's
requirement of an actual entry before the amendment's prohibitions can come into play, 24 and has permitted the role of trespass
to continue to plague the law of search and seizure.
From this examination, it is submitted that the requirement
of a trespass, in order to have a search under the amendment, is
misplaced. As recognized in Boyd, a trespass was not required for
the right of privacy to be invaded. What trespass did was to
aggravate the invasion. Granted, that an unwarranted intrusion
into a man's home did violate his "castle." But to limit the invasion to only physical intrusions is to elevate the home over the
individual. It is to give priority to property rights over personal
States, 333 U.S. 10, 15, 17 (1948); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 80
(1949); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1951); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964); an apartment, Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 267, 273 (1960); a rented room in a boarding house, McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); closed letters and sealed
packages in the mail, Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 735 (1878); a barn
separated from a home, Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447, 449 (5th
Cir. 1955); a garage, Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5, 6 (1932);
Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436, 439 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 904 (1950); United States v. Hayden, 140 F. Supp. 429, 435 (D. Md.
1956); an enclosed back yard, Hobson v. United States, 226 F.2d 890, 894
(8th Cir. 1955); boats or vessels, whether on the high seas or not, United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); United States v. Coppolo, 2 F.
Supp. 115, 116 (D.N.J. 1932); a smokehouse, United States v. Mullin,
329 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1964); Roberson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752,
754-55 (6th Cir. 1948); a shed, Walker v. United States, 125 F.2d 395, 396
(5th Cir. 1942); public toilet facilities, Bielicki v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 57 Cal.2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 290 (1962); Britt v. Superior
Court of Santa Clara County, 58 Cal.2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 819 (1962);
contra, Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 253, 254, 255-57 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 981 (1966); Poore v. Ohio, 243 F. Supp. 777,
782-83 (N.D. Ohio 1965); a student's locker in a public school, People v.
Overton, 51 Misc.2d 140, 273 N.Y.S.2d 143 (App. T. 1966); a locked cupboard in a common hallway of an apartment building, United States v.
Lumia, 36 F. Supp. 552 (W.D.N.Y. 1941); a taxicab, Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1960); and an automobile, as well as other types of
motor vehicles, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 153-54, 156
(1925); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 (1931); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 164, 177-78 (1949); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 104 (1959); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964); cf.
United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948).
24. The Court has, however, implicitly overruled that part of Olinstead which noted that search and seizure, for fourth amendment purposes,
does not "forbid hearing or sight." 277 U.S. at 465. See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963), which suppressed statements
obtained or overheard after an illegal entry. In Wong Sun, the Court in
suppressing the statements, relied upon McGinnis v. United States, 227
F.2d 598, 603 (1st Cir. 1955), which in turn had suppressed observations
made as a result of an illegal entry. Thus, we see that the amendment
does in fact apply to "hearing or sight," provided the same is accomplished
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rights.2
And if it be conceded that the framers of the amendment
"knew of only one type of search, that involving physical entry
into a dwelling,"2 6 this ignorance should not have the effect of
placing the amendment in a judicial strait jacket.27 To do so
"would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to
render it incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to
stamp upon our jurisprudence the '2unchangeableness
attributed to
8
the laws of the Medes and Persians.
A.

II. THE PROBLEM OF THE AUTOMOBILE
WarrantlessSearch for Contraband

29

The great command of the fourth amendment is that whensoever possible, a search and seizure must be conducted under the
authority of a search warrant.A0 The reasons for this have been
aptly put.
[T]he informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants ...
are to be preferred over the hurried3 1 action of officers ...

who may

happen to make arrests.

by means of a forbidden entry into a protected area. This is as far as the
Court has seen fit to go, however.
25. For an analysis of why this priority should be rejected, as taught
by the very wording of the fourth amendment itself, see Mascolo, InterSpousal Consent to Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: A Constitutional
Approach, 40 CONN. B. J. 351, 384-87 (1966).
26. LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra note 17, at 200.
27. Cf. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908), wherein the
Court refused to confine due process to those settled usages and modes of
proceedings in existence in seventeenth-century England at the time of
first emigration to this country.
28. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
For a striking
example of such thinking, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149
(1925), and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928), wherein
the Court observed that the fourth amendment only applies to prohibit that
which was considered an unreasonable search and seizure when the
amendment was adopted. See also, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
624-43 (1886); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1949),
aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1, 7 (1950); Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813,
816 (S.D. Cal. 1947); State v. Blood, 190 Kan. 812, 820, 378 P.2d 548, 553
(1963). But cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963).
29. Any reference hereafter to the "automobile" will apply likewise
to other motor vehicles, since the generic term "motor vehicle" includes
automobiles. Furthermore, as seen at note 23 supra, the amendment's protection extends generally to motor vehicles.
30. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261
(1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). Since the amendment extends to arrests, e.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357. U.S. 480,
485-86 (1958); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 n.6 (1964); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 112 n.3 (1964); Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465, 467
(1958), the same requirement of a warrant applies to an arrest. See,
e.g., State v. Spellman, 153 Conn. 65, 69, 212 A.2d 413, 415 (1965).
31. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
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The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in
32 the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.

Because of its mobility, the automobile presents a special problem vis-A-vis the warrant requirement."8 Therefore, an exception
has developed which permits a warrantless search of an automobile
where there is probable cause to believe that it is being used to
transport contraband. 4 However, this does not permit a stop-andsearch at the "whim, caprice or mere suspicion" 5 of law enforcement officers. Nor will this exception permit a stop-and-search of
even those vehicles actually transporting contraband, unless the
officers have probable cause.Y6
The automobile has so far remained the only exception that the
Supreme Court has explicitly permitted3T to another rule of search
and seizure, which states that a warrantless search incidental to a
valid arrest, in order to be reasonable, must take place after the
arrest, and not before.38 The majority of the courts that have
32. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
33. E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). See generally, LANDYNSKI, op.
cit. supra note 17, at 87-98.
34. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949); Husty v.
United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 (1931); Carroll v. United States, supra
note 33, at 153, 154; United States v. O'Leary, 201 F. Supp. 926, 928 (E.D.
Tenn. 1961); cf. Preston v. United States, supra note 33, at 367; Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959). But even here, where reasonably
practicable, a warrant should be obtained. Carroll v. United States, supra
at 156. Needless to say, it is difficult to imagine when it would be considered by a court to be reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant. See
LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra note 17, at 91. For this reason, a search warrant
is seldom or rarely required for an automobile. United States v. Johnson,
363 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 1966); Flores v. United States, 234 F.2d 604,
605 (5th Cir. 1956).
35. Brinegar v. United States, supra note 34, at 177; Carroll v.United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54.
36. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v.
United States, supra note 35, at 149, 154, 158-59.
37. See discussion in Mosco v. United States, 301 F.2d 180, 187-88 (9th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied as to the co-defendant, Hansen v. United States,
371 U.S. 842 (1962).
38. E.g., Lee v. United States, 232 F.2d 354, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Hurst v. California, 211 F. Supp. 387, 392 (N.D. Cal. 1962), aff'd on other
grounds, 325 F.2d 891, 898, 899 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd on the issue of the
retroactivity of the Mapp exclusionary rule, 381 U.S. 760 (1965); United
States v. Royster, 204 F. Supp. 760, 762-63 (N.D. Ohio 1961); cf. United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950); Mosco v. United States, supra
note 37; People v. Jones, 38 Misc. 2d 125, 238 N.Y.S.2d 49, 53 (Monroe
County Ct. 1963). The validity of such a search turns upon the issue of
when the arrest took place. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960);
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passed upon this issue, however, have taken the position that if an
officer of the law is in possession of probable cause to make an
arrest, and it is his intent to make such arrest, then it is not unreasonable if his search precedes the arrest. This doctrine might be
called the Simon rule, after the name of a much-cited case that
has endorsed it.81
B.

The Right to Search Incident to an Arrest for a Minor
Traffic Offense

It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the relative
merits of both the "search after arrest" and the Simon rules, except
to note that under neither may a search be made in the absence of
probable cause. Thus, as we shall see, under neither rule is an
observational search permissible in the absence of probable cause.
In short, an observational search made without benefit of probable cause cannot invoke either rule to sustain its legality. It
may also be noted that the Simon rule evolved from a misplaced
emphasis upon the exception permitting a warrantless search upon
probable cause of an automobile. 40 However, the rules are a necessary adjunct to what is probably the major exception to the warrant rule-an exception that has grown in frequency in direct ratio
to the increase in the number of vehicles using the public highways.
This exception is the one that permits a search without warrant
as an incident to a valid arrest, 41 and it has had a great impact
upon automobile search and seizure cases.
Before proceeding to a discussion of those cases dealing with
the right of peace officers to search either a driver or his vehicle
as an incident to an arrest for a minor traffic violation, it is
cf. Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 876 (1962).
39. People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531, 533 (1955). Accord,
United States v. Devenere, 332 F.2d 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1964); United States
v. Boston, 330 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1964); Fernandez v. United States,
321 F.2d 283, 287 n.8 (9th Cir. 1963); Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328,
332 (9th Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962); United States v.
Smalls, 223 F. Supp. 387, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); State v. Hutchins, 43 N.J. 85,
202 A.2d 678, 688 (1964); People v. Cassese, 47 Misc. 2d 1031, 1033, 263
N.Y.S.2d 734, 736 (N.Y. City Ct. 1965); People v. Salerno, 38 Misc. 2d 467,
235 N.Y.S.2d 879, 883 (Sup. Ct. 1962); State v. Hoover, 219 Or. 288, 347 P.2d
69, 76 (1959); State v. Biloche, 66 Wash.2d 314, 402 P.2d 491, 493 (1965);
cf. State v. Elliott, 153 Conn. 147, 154, 215 A.2d 108, 111-12 (1965). Although the Supreme Court recognizes the existence of the Simon rule,
e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 43 (1963), it has yet to pass upon its
constitutionality. For criticism of the rule, see, e.g., SOSEL, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 70.
40. See Mosco v. United States, 301 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1962).
41. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 60 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947);
Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
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necessary to review the reasons for the search-incident-to-a-validarrest exception.
This exception permits a search of the person arrested, the
things under his immediate control, and the place of arrest, for
weapons, the fruits of the crime, the implements used to commit
the crime, and "things which might be used to assault an officer or
effect an escape. '4 2 Historically, the prime, in fact the sole basis
for this exception, at least at the common law, was one of necessity-a necessity prompted by the desire of the law to protect its
officers from harm. 43 Although the justifications for such an in-

cidental search have not changed, the permissible scope thereof
has greatly increased. 44 The problem has therefore arisen as to
whether such an incidental search may be permitted when a motorist is arrested for a minor traffic offense.
On numerous occasions, motorists are arrested for minor traffic violations, as, for example, where a driver is operating his automobile without a license, or has been apprehended in the act of
going through a red light. The question has consequently arisen:
Does the arresting officer have the right to conduct an incidental
search of the vehicle? The majority of the courts have answered
this in the negative, and the reason therefor has been summarized
thus:
[S]ince the right to search incident to arrest is confined to
the fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband connected with
the crime, a necessary product of the crime would not be
present in a typical
minor traffic-infraction situation to
45
allow a search.

42. Preston v. United States, supra note 41, at 367, and cases cited.
See also People v. Rodriguez, 47 Misc. 2d 551, 262 N.Y.S.2d 859, 864 (Nassau County Ct. 1965), which held, inter alia, that such a search does not
permit a complete search of the person to uncover evidence of other crimes.
Only a "frisk" is permitted.
43. Cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68, 72-73, 79
(1950) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter); LANDYNSKI, op.
cit. supra note 17, at 98-99.
44. See LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra note 17, at 99-117, where Professor
Landynski cogently demonstrates that the incidental search has become a
device that "is no longer justified in the name of necessity but is regarded
as reasonable in itself." Id. at 117.
45. Barnette, The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio Upon the Connecticut Law
of Search and Seizure, 37 CONN. B. J.52, 81 (1963). Accord, United States
v. Washington, 249 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.C. 1965) (dictum that an arrest for a
traffic offense will not support a random search of the entire vehicle);
State v. Cuellar, 25 Conn. Supp. 229, 233, 200 A.2d 729, 731 (1964); State v.
Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W.2d 327, 333 (1963) (dictum), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 867 (1963); State v. Brown, 25 Wis. 2d 413, 130 N.W.2d 760, 763
(1964) (dictum); SOBEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 75, 117, 119-20. Although
this position overlooks the safety justification which originally gave impetus to the incidental search, Mr. Justice Sobel has observed that there is
probably little danger to the officer who issues a traffic summons. Furthermore, if the officer detects any danger, he may take necessary protective measures without resorting to a search. Id. at 121-22.
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One judge has noted that "The consequences of permitting a
search' for traffic violation arrests is frightening. It defies common sense as well as experience. ' 46 Hence, an arrest for illegal
parking will not justify an incidental search of a vehicle;4 7 nor
one for driving under the influence 48 or without a license; 49 nor
one for going through a "stop" sign; 50 nor one for improper passing;51 nor one for operating a vehicle with only one headlight
54
burning; 52 nor one for speeding; 53 nor one for a broken taillight;
nor may a search of a vehicle be made as an incident to stopping it
for a routine license check. 55
A contrary position has been taken, however, by some courts
where the search is directed at the motorist himself; and the reason
for this is the officer's safety.5 6 Thus, an arrest for failure to
46. SOBEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 122.
47. People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57, 58 (1956) (dictum);
People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, 437 (1960); People v. Mayo,
19 Ill. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440, 441 (1960); People v. James, 46 Misc. 2d 138,
259 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243-44 (Sup. Ct. 1965). By way of dicta, however, the
court in Watkins indicated that some traffic violations would justify a
search of a vehicle; -e.g., no license plates, or obscured plates on a vehicle
being operated in the early hours of the morning. People v. Watkins,
116 N.E.2d at 437.
48. People v. Beaman, 44 Misc.2d 336, 253 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1964). Contra, People v. Robinson, 62 Cal. 2d 889, 894, 402 P.2d 834, 837
(1965).
49. State v. Cuellar, 25 Conn. Supp. 229, 233-34, 200 A.2d 729, 731
(1964); Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Ky. 1964) (recognizing, however, that in such a situation it might be permissible to search the
motorist for weapons, or to prevent an escape); State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J.
Super. 427, 202 A.2d 448, 451 (1964); People v. Rodriguez, 47 Misc.2d .551,
262 N.Y.S.2d 859, 865 (Nassau County Ct. 1965).
50. United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 224 F. Supp. 210, 213
(E.D. Wis. 1963) (dictum); People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d
456, 460 (1960).
51. Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1964) (with the

same recognition of the possible right to search the driver for weapons, or
to prevent an escape).

52. Ellison v. State, 383 P.2d 716, 719, 720 (Alaska 1963); People v.
Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97 N.W.2d 16, 20 (1959).
53. United States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Del. 1962); cf.
United States v. Owens, 346 F.2d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 878 (1965). Contra, State v. Cherry, 387 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965).
54. State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J. Super. 427, 202 A.2d 448 (1964).
55. Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633, 635, 636 (1947);
Cox v. State, 181 Tenn. 344, 181 S.W.2d 338, 340 (1944); Pruitt v. State,
389 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex. Cr. App. 1965).
56. For example, see Barnes v. State, 25 Wis.2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264,
269 (1964).
Accord, Agata, Searches and Seizures Incident to Traffic
Violations-A Reply to Professor Simeone, 7 ST. Louis L.J. 1, 8, 16-18,
29-30 (1962) (noting the distinctions between a "summons" and an "arrest," Id. at 10-11); cf. Simeone, Search and Seizure Incident to Traffic
Violations, 6 ST. Louis L.J. 506, 516, 518-19 (1961).
Contra, Note, Search
and Seizure Incident to Traffic Violations, 14 HASTiNcs L.J. 459, 463 (1963).
For a critique of Professor Agata's article, see SoBEr, op. cit. supra note 8,
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produce a license or a registration will justify an incidental search
of the driver for weapons or other instrumentalities that might be
used for resistance or escape. 7 The same incidental search has
been permitted where there has been an arrest for driving a vehicle
with obstructed vision. 58 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit has strongly intimated that it would not
countenance an incidental search of an accused for whom an arrest
warrant for two minor traffic violations-failing to signal for a
right turn and having faulty brake and signal lights-has been
issued.59
As we shall see, this right or denial of incidental search for
traffic offenses will have a direct bearing on those situations involving functional observation on the part of officers who stop
motorists; provided, however, that such observation is classified as
part of the search process. Naturally, where it is determined that
a given observation is not part of such process, then the merits of
the respective arguments, either pro or con, concerning the right
of incidental search for traffic offenses become immaterial. Additionally, the law of arrest has a bearing upon the concept of functional observation, because "the problems of arrest and search
are, of course, inextricably interwound." 60
III. WHEN DoES AN
A.

ARREST

TAKE PLACE?

"Arrest" Defined

There is probably no facet of criminal law more complex or
confusing than the law of arrest. An "arrest" in its restrictive
sense has been defined as follows:
[A]n arrest, in the technical and restricted sense of the
criminal law, is "the apprehension or taking into custody of
an alleged offender, in order that he may be brought into
the proper court to answer for a crime." . . . When used
in this sense, an arrest involves the following elements:
(1) A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real
or pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested by a person
having present power to control the person arrested; (3) A
communication by the arresting officer to the person whose
arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there
at 120-21, who further notes that an attempt by some courts to find "ex-

ceptional circumstances" to justify a search is probably motivated by a
reluctance to apply the fourth amendment to "obviously guilty" persons.
57. State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d 130, 131-32 (1962); People
v. Isaac, 36 Misc. 2d 1018, 239 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626-27 (N.Y. County Ct. 1963).
58. People v. Zeravich, 30 Ill.2d 275, 195 N.E.2d 612, 613 (1964).
59. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961), recognizing that the arrest warrant was only a sham to facilitate an illegal
search for narcotics, and that it was being used as a pretext to search for the
fruits of an unrelated offense. Id. at 265-67.
60.

LANDYNSKI,

op. cit. supra note 45,

Spring 1967]

LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE

to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him. 1
There is, however, a broader meaning of "arrest," which has
been expressed in the following way:
There must be some detention of the person to constitute
arrest. This of course would mean any arrest made or
detention in a criminal proceeding. .

.

. "An arrest is the

seizing of a person and detaining him in the custody of
the law." From these authorities, it may be concluded, we
think, that the term arrest may be applied to any case
where a person is taken into custody or restrained of his
full liberty, or where the detention of a person
in custody
62
is continued for even a short period of time.
Thus, in its broader sense, arrest "relates to restraints upon a
person's liberty of locomotion, movement 6 from
place to place," '
4
and it has been so construed by some courts.
B. The Stopping of Motor Vehicles
A court, in passing on the issue of the relationship between an
arrest and the stoppage of a motor vehicle by an officer of the law,
must choose one of these concepts of arrest. If the restrictive concept is chosen, obviously the mere stoppage will not constitute an
arrest. On the other hand, if the broader concept is endorsed,
then it would appear that an arrest has in fact been made. This
61. Melton v. State, 75 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1954). Accord, People v.
Mirbelle, 276 Ill.
App. 533, 540-42 (1934); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 541, 543 (1924). See also Jenkins v. United States,
161 F.2d 99, 101 (10th Cir. 1947).
62. Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1934), affd on other
grounds, 293 U.S. 76, 83 (1934).
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accord, United
States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837, 840 (D.D.C. 1957); District of Columbia v.
Perry, 215 A.2d 845, 847 (D.C. App. 1966); Price v. United States, 119 A.2d
718, 719 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956); Gearing v. State, 185 So. 2d 652, 653, 654
(Miss. 1966); State v. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254, 156 N.E.2d 840, 848 (1959);
Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633, 635-36 (1947).
63. Wilgus, supra note 61, at 541.
64. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959); United
States v. Thompson, 356 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
964 (1966); United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697, 698 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 933 (1963); cf. United States v. Smith, 31 F.R.D. 553,
562 (D.D.C. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 324 F.2d 879, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964); State v. Towry, 26 Conn. Supp. 35, 38, 21G
A.2d 455, 457 (1965).
These cases recognize that in a given situation an
arrest may involve a restriction of or a restraint upon the liberty of movement of an individual, so that his locomotion is interrupted. Although in
Henry v. United States, supra, the government had conceded that the arrest had taken place when the agents had stopped the car in which petitioner was traveling, the Supreme Court agreed with this concession and
held that petitioner's arrest had been effected when the officers "interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty of movement." 361 U.S.
at 103.
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decision, however, is further complicated by the purpose of the
stop. This purpose has often been the determining factor of the
existence or nonexistence of an arrest. Thus we see that when a
motorist is stopped and questioned simply as to his identity and
actions, or for a license and registration check, no arrest has been
held to have taken place. 5 Where, however, the motorist is stopped
and questioned for a traffic offense, and is confronted by an officer
with such charge, an arrest has been held to have been effected.
One court has even gone so far as to say that an arrest begins
when a peace officer7 begins pursuit of a vehicle for the purpose of
6
arresting its driver.
65. Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1965)(momentary detention to determine if driver had license was not an arrest);
Schook v. United States, 337 F.2d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 1964) (distinguishing
"restraint" from "temporary detention for routine questioning"); Busby v.
United States, 296 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876
(1962); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 660 (1963); People
v. Davis, 222 Cal. App.2d 75, 34 Cal. Rptr. 796, 797 (1963); District of
Columbia v. Perry, 215 A.2d 845, 847 (D.C. App. 1966); Pruitt v. State,
389 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex. Cr. App. 1965); cf. Wilgus, supra note 61, at 553.
Accord, United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 779-83, (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation & the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems & Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUm. L. REV.
62, 65-66 (1966); Kuh, Reflections on New York's "Stop-&-Frisk" Law and
Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 32, 35 (1965);
LAFAVE, ARREST 346 n.14 (1965).
Contra, Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277,
198 S.W.2d 633, 635 (1947); SOBEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 115. The Supreme
Court has left this an open question. See, e.g., Rios v. United States, 364
U.S. 253, 261-62 (1960).
It has also been held that stopping an individual while walking on a
sidewalk or in the street, for an identity check, is no arrest. E.g., White v.
United States, 222 A.2d 843, 845 (D.C. App. 1966); People v. Rivera, 14
N.Y.2d 441, 445, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461, 201 N.E.2d 32, 34 (1964), cert. denied,
Rivera v. New York, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa
Super. 1, 5, 223 A.2d 873, 875 (1966); cf. United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d
524, 530, and authorities cited (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823
(1962); United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 780-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 220, 219 N.E.2d 595, 597
(1966); Note, 78 HARv. L. REV. 473, 474-76 (1964); Collings, Toward More
Workable Rules of Search & Seizure-An Amicus Curial Brief, 50 CALIF.
L. REV. 421, 437 (1962). For an interesting listing of the requirements for
permissible inquiry detention, as distinguished from an arrest, see SOBEL,
op. cit.
noteStates
8, at 63-64.
66. supra
United
v. Washington, 249 F. Supp. 40, 41 (D.D.C. 1965)
(arrest occurred when police officer waved defendant-motorist to a halt and
restricted his liberty of movement pursuant to a traffic violation); District
of Columbia v.- Perry, 215 A.2d 845 (D.C. App. 1965). The court's theory
in Perry was that when a driver is overtaken, stopped and confronted with
a charge of a traffic offense (in this case speeding), he is not "free to get
into his car and leave whenever he wished." Ibid. If he were stopped for
a license check, it would seem he is no more free to leave at will than
when stopped for a traffic offense. The degree of restraint intended by
the officer is the same in either case.
67. Terry v. State, 252 Miss. 479, 173 So.2d 889, 891 (1965); Smith v.
State, 240 Miss, 738, 128 So.2d 857, 859 (1961).
But see United States
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From this review, certain factors emerge. In the first place,
many courts, in passing upon the existence of an arrest in any
given situation involving the stoppage of a motor vehicle, are more
concerned with the officer's intent than with any particular meaning of "arrest." Secondly, whether an arrest has actually taken
place will depend upon what the factual examination reveals concerning the degree of restraint involved. 68 This degree is of critical
importance, and probably represents the only measurable differential between an arrest and permissible detention inquiry. Unfortunately, the distinction between such detention and arrest "is admittedly a thin one,"6 9 because in each situation there is some deprivation of freedom of action.
Finally, although the practice of stopping and detaining individuals for inquiry, under what might be termed "suspicious circumstances," has become more acute with the advent of the automobile, it is, nevertheless, an ancient practice that "has its roots in
early English practice and was approved by the common law commentators and the courts. 70o It would appear that one may predict
with safety that the practice will remain with us in the foreseeable
future, and will continue to receive the sanction of the courts.

IV.

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN ARREST AND SEARCH & SEIZURE

Since, as we have seen,71 the fourth amendment applies to
arrests, as well as to searches, a "working relation" between the
ex rel. Krogness v. Gladden, 242 F. Supp. 499, 500 (D. Or. 1965); State v.
Krogness, 238 Or. 135, 388 P.2d 120, 122 (1963), cert. denied, Krogness v.
Oregon, 377 U.S. 992 (1964) (both seem to require that the overtaken
motorist be removed from his vehicle and placed in a police cruiser, before
he can be considered to be under arrest).
68. United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of
Arrest?, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 402, 403 (1960). See also Ronayne,
The Right to Investigate & New York's "Stop & Frisk" Law, 33 FORD.
L. REV. 211, 212-13 (1964).
69. United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524, 530 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 823 (1962).
For this court it should be particularly thin, considering that it has endorsed the broader concept of arrest. E.g., United
States v. Thompson, 356 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
964 (1966); United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697, 698 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 933 (1963).
For an illuminating discussion of the
thinness involved, see Foote, Safeguards in the Law, of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L.
REv. 16, 37-38 (1957).
70. United States v. Vita, supra note 69. Accord, People v. Rivera,
14 N.Y.2d 441, 445-46, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35 (1964),
cert. denied, Rivera v. New York, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); cf. United States
v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 81-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
For representative
examples of common law cases and commentators endorsing the practice, see Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6, 7, and authorities
cited (C.P. 1810); 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 122, 129 (6th ed.
1777); 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 89, 96-97 (Amer. ed. 1847).
71. E.g., authorities cited supra note 30.
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two has developed over the years. This relation is embodied in a
number of judge-made rules that bear upon the legality of any
given warrantless arrest or search, when the claim is made that one
is justified by the other. A review of these rules is now in order,
as they are germane to the subject of this article, especially where
a functional observation is made without benefit of probable cause.
It will not be necessary, however, to attempt any extensive analysis of them, for many of them are self-explanatory, and their
primary purpose herein is to assist the reader in familiarizing
himself with the mechanics of a search. From this will come a
discussion of the meaning of "search" under the amendment.
The law of arrest and the law of search are most interwoven
in the field of incidental search. This is a search without warrant
that seeks its reasonableness 72 in the legality of the supporting
arrest. 73

Therefore, if the arrest falls, the incidental search falls

with it, no matter how reasonable it may otherwise be.7 4 Conversely, since the incidental search "rides" with the arrest, it may
not be resorted to to validate a supporting illegal arrest.

72. In passing, it may be noted that the "reasonableness" of such a
search is not exclusively limited to the legality of the arrest. For example,
the arrest could be legal and the incidental search unreasonable, as where
it is too extensive and therefore out of proportion to the end sought. E.g.,
Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 912 (1959); Zimmermann v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583, 585 (3rd Cir. 1939);
cf. Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 347 (1957); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
464-67 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58
(1931); or where it is conducted by the use of excessive force or with
unnecessary brutality, e.g., Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 750
(9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958); State v. Collins, 150
Conn. 488, 492, 191 A.2d 253, 255 (1963); cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172-74 (1952); Talglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th
Cir. 1961).
73. E.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Of course, the opposite
is never permitted. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 194 F. Supp. 90, 92
(D.D.C. 1961), wherein the court condemned an attempt to justify an arrest
as an incident of a prior warrantless search.
74. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13, 16-17 (1948); Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962); Brown v. State, 62 So.2d 348, 349 (Fla.
1952); Smith v. State, 240 Miss. 738, 128 So.2d 857, 860 (1961); People v.
Jones, 38 Misc.2d 125, 238 N.Y.S.2d 49, 53 (1963). The validity of such a
search necessarily turns on the time of the arrest. Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960).
75. Cervantes v. United States, 278 F.2d 350, 353 (9th Cir. 1960);
Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840, 855 (1965); State v. Spellman,
153 Conn. 65, 71, 212 A.2d 413, 416, and cases cited (1965); Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 208 Pa. Super. 371, 375, 222 A.2d 406, 408 (1966); cf.
State v. Cuellar, 25 Conn. Supp. 229, 232, 200 A.2d 729, 731 (1964). See
also authorities listed in note 74, supra. On the other hand, if an arrest
stems from an illegal search, then it in turn will fall with the search.
E.g., People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 660 (1963).
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Neither an arrest nor a search may be predicated upon suspicion, 76 or anything else that falls below the standards of probable cause. 77 From this flows another rule which prohibits law
enforcement officers from using an illegal arrest as a sham or
pretext to conduct an exploratory search for evidence of guilt or of
crime 7 -- a type of search that has been repeatedly condemned by
the Supreme Court. 79 In short, a search tainted with the element
of fraud or subterfuge, as where it is conducted incidental to a
sham arrest, is unreasonable.80 And, like all searches, it will not
be legalized by what it discovers or brings to light.8' Further
flowing from this all-important prerequisite of probable cause is
may not first search without
the additional rule that law officers
82
probable cause, and then arrest.
V. THE CONCEPT OF "SEARCH" UNDER THE FouRTH AMwDmIVir
As with "arrest," "search" too has a double concept-a concept
that may be classified as narrow, on the one hand, and broad or
liberal, on the other. The determination of whether given activity
76. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (search);
Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5, 6 (1932) (search); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454
(1957) (arrest): Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101, 104 (1959)
(arrest); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (arrest).
77. As to what those standards are, see, e.g., Dumbra v. United
States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925). As to what they are not, see Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959).
For an examination of the
distinguishing characteristics between evidence required to show probable
cause, and that required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1949); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959).
78. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153 (1947); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d
291, 295 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Harris, 321 F.2d 739, 741 (6th
Cir. 1963); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265-67 (9th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
950 (1958).
79. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452,
464-65 (1932); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153, 154 (1947); cf.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886). Accord, United States
v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Del. 1962). This type of search is to be
distinguished from the general search, "in that in the former, at least in
inception, the primary purpose [is] to arrest, while in the latter the primary purpose from its inception [is] to search." SOBEL, op. cit. supra note
8, at 74-75.
80. E.g., Love v. United States, 170 F.2d 32, 33 (4th Cir. 1948), and
cases cited, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 912 (1949).
81. United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 68,
190 A.2d 304, 310-11 (1963), cert. denied, Bosurgi v. Pennsylvania, 375 U.S.
910 (1963).
82. E.g., authorities listed in note 75, supra.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 71

falls within the category of "search" will necessarily depend upon
which concept or definition is adopted. In analyzing this double
concept, we should keep at hand the admonition that, as one court
has put it, "no literal or mechanical approach should be adopted
in determining what may constitute a search and seizure." 83
A.

The Narrow Concept

The narrow concept of "search," adopted by some courts, has
been defined in this language: "The term 'search' necessarily implies the prying into or uncovering of that which one has a right to,
and intends to, and effectively does conceal from the view or scrutiny of another. 8 4 While this concept partially recognizes the
importance of the mental processes of the searcher, it places primary emphasis upon the hidden locale of that which is sought.
Under the narrow concept the relation to open or plain sight
of that which is found will determine the existence of a search.
This implies a conscious design on the part of the owner or possessor to conceal or keep out of sight that which the searcher uncovers. Therefore, if the owner or possessor takes no active measures to conceal his property or possessions, in short, if he exposes
them to open view and they are oberved, no search has taken
place.8 5 It is interesting to note that under this concept, emphasis
is attached to the mental processes of the owner or possessor,
rather than those of the seeker.8
This concept conflicts with the fourth amendment, because it
overlooks the fact that the property or possessions are protected
thereunder regardless of the presence or absence of concealment,
83. Nelson v. Hancock, 239 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D.N.H. 1965). (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142, and cases
cited in n.7 (1962); State v. Raymond, 142 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Iowa 1966).
84. Poore v. Ohio, 243 F. Supp. 777, 782 (N.D. Ohio 1965). (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, People v. Green, 235 Cal. App.2d 506, 45 Cal. Rptr.
371, 375 (1965); People v. King, 243 Cal. App.2d 423, 44 Cal. Rptr. 500, 503
(1965), cert. denied, King v. California, 384 U.S. 1026 (1966), State v.
Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322, 326 (1965).
(Emphasis supplied.);
Lindsey v. State, 204 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ind. 1965).
85. As one court colorfully put it: "[W]here one is so foolish as to
leave his windows unsecured he may not complain if another observes
an illegal act being committed therein." Gil v. State, 394 S.W.2d 810, 811
(Tex. Cr. App. 1965); Giacona v. State, 372 S.W.2d 328, 330, 334 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1962), cert. denied, Giacona v. Texas, 375 U.S. 843 (1963). This would
appear to indicate that the right to privacy is measured by what steps
the individual takes to protect it, and not by what measures law officers
take to invade it.
86. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-75 (1966), wherein the
Court held that the individual's right not to incriminate himself initially
depends upon the officers affirmatively advising him of such right, and not
upon his exercise of such right.
As one judge has strongly intimated, if the officer's purpose is to
search, then let us call it that, and insist that he obtain a warrant. SOBEL,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 3.
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provided they are located in a constitutionally protected area.8 7
In short, if possessions are located in an area protected by the
amendment, then that is all that is required to extend its blanket
protection to them. That is the only "concealment" that the
amendment requires. The amendment, it should be remembered,
was not designed to protect only secrecy.8 8 Therefore, the concept
of search should not be limited to a quest for only that which is
hidden or secreted.
B.

The Broad Concept

Under the broad or liberal concept of "search," greater emphasis is attached to the activities of the searcher, as distinguished
from the primary emphasis upon the activities of the victim under
the narrow concept. This transfer of emphasis becomes apparent
from the definition of search adopted by some courts. For example:
A search implies an examination of one's premises or person with a view to the discovery of contraband or evidence
of guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal action. The
term implies exploratory investigation or quest.8 9
While this concept is not altogether satisfactory, it does make
better sense than the narrow view of search, for it correctly places
the primary emphasis where it belongs, upon the activities and the
necessarily involved mental processes of the searcher. And this is
as it should be, because it cannot be seriously contended that the
87. E.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357
(1931); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); State v. Fahy, 149 Conn.
577, 586, 183 A.2d 256, 261 (1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Fahy
v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 92 (1963).
See also authorities listed supra
note 23; Mascolo, supra note 25, at 385-86.
88. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 449 (1963) (dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Brennan); of. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HArV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890).
89. Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957).
(Emphasis supplied.) Accord, United States ex rel. Stacey v. Pate, 324 F.2d
934, 935 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 937 (1964); Commonwealth
v. Anderson, 208 Pa. Super. 323, 326-27, 222 A.2d 495, 498 (1966); Commonwealth v. Calvarese, 199 Pa. Super. 319, 322, 185 A.2d 657, 659 (1962).
Although Anderson quoted this definition from Calvarese, which in turn
quoted from Haerr, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, while adopting the
broader concept of search, made little application of it, as will be subsequently discussed. Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009, 1011-12
(1938) (quoting from Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle's 3rd Rev.). (Emphasis supplied.)
"Premises" must necessarily include possessions. See
note 23, supra, for a listing of those places and possessions protected by
the amendment. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966),
wherein the court held that the compulsory administration of a blood test
to determine the alcoholic content of a motorist "plainly involves the
broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment." (Emphasis supplied.) Contrast this with the narrowly "conceived
reach" adopted by the court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149
(1925), and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
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victim is a participant. Although the victim may commit some act
which may arouse the officer's curiosity or suspicions, thereby
setting in motion the search process, it is the officer who searches
and the victim who receives the "benefit" of such attention. What
all of this shows is that the critical factor in any search is the
mental processes of the searcher. They lend definition to his activities, and it is to them that we must turn if his conduct is to
be rationally understood and explained. It is primarily through
these processes that the imprimatur of "search" will attach to
such conduct. Only when viewed in this light, does the function
of observation in the search process take on a role of importance.
Finally, it should also be noted that the concept of search is
not concerned with the reasonableness of the officer's activity.
Reasonableness will come into play only after it has been determined that a search actually took place, and then to determine its
legality. If there has been no search, then the concept of reasonableness under the fourth amendment is without particular relevance, although that under the due process clause of the fifth
may have such relevance.90
VI.

WHm DOES A SEARCH TAKE PLACE?

A. Generally
Before moving on to a discussion of the function of observation
in the law of search and seizure, it is advisable to briefly discuss
when a search takes place. This discussion will involve, of necessity, the automobile, with which so often functional observation
has been involved or associated. 91
For a fourth-amendment search to take place, there must be a
hunt or quest accomplished by means of a physical intrusion into
an area protected under the fourth amendment. 92 In short, a po90. For a discussion of reasonableness under both the fourth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth, see Blackford v. United States,
247 F.2d 745, 750-51 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958);
Mascolo, supra note 25, at 394-95.
91. Cf. SOBEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 64.
92. E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d
681, 685 (5th Cir. 1955); United States ex rel. Krogness v. Gladden, 242
F. Supp. 499, 501 (D. Or. 1965); People v. Kramer, 38 Misc.2d 889, 239
N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (Sup. Ct. 1963); cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 457, 464, 465-66 (1928); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 43 (1963).
"Area" includes the body of the individual, Schmerber v. California, 84
U.S. 757, 799 (1966), as well as his clothing. Barnes v. State, 25 Wis.2d
116, 130 N.W.2d 264, 269 (1964).
The requirement of a trespass, or physical intrusion, applies only to
the existence of a search. It has nothing, per se, to do with the reasonableness of the search. The concept of reasonableness applies to either the
presence or absence of a warrant, or to the manner, i.e., the presence or
absence of brutal or shocking conduct, in which the search is conducted.
Therefore, trespass is irrelevant to a determination of the existence of probable cause, which is the primary factor in reasonableness. Nor does it

Spring 1967]

LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE

lice officer, to search, must look for or seek something by means of

a trespassory intrusion.9 3 This means that, for fourth-amendment
purposes, a quest which has been set in motion by the officer's
mental processes alone is not a search. He must step into a protected area before it will be said that he is conducting a search.
The penetration of the "step" need not be great, nor need it be
accomplished by the officer himself. Electronic devices under his
control will suffice. 94 Given this penetration, then, if he enters
with the intent to seek or look for evidence, a search has been set
in motion.
B. The Automobile
Here, too, because "the law with respect to search of automobiles is different only in minor respects from the law applicable
to search of fixed premises," 95 a trespassory intrusion is required.96
Thus, if a police officer stands outside of an automobile and looks
into its interior, he is not engaging in a search. 9 If the law perbear upon the extensiveness or the intensity of the search. It may have
some bearing on the duration of the search, as where a search is conducted through the medium of electronic surveillance; for then, there is a
continuing trespass. But where there is a conventional search, the initial
trespass is not correlated to the duration of the quest.
From this, we see that the mere presence of a trespass will not render
inadmissible the fruits of a search. United States v. Romano, 330 F.2d 566,
569 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 942 (1965). If the trespass or
intrusion is into an area not protected by the amendment, as for example,
the "open fields," then evidence thereby obtained will be admissible. E.g.,
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). Cf. Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961), wherein the trespass was into a protected area, and was made without benefit of either a warrant or probable
cause. Therefore, it was a general search for evidence of crime, which is
forbidden. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480 (1965).
93. E.g., Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 402 P.2d 741, 743 (1965); State v. Krogness,
238 Or. 135, 388 P.2d 120, 125 (1963), cert. denied, Krogness v. Oregon, 377
U.S. 992 (1964).
94. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506-10, 512 (1961).

95.

SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SE zURE 115

(Kings County Crim. Bar Assoc. 1964).
96. People v. Wright, 153 Cal. App.2d 35, 313 P.2d 868, 870 (Ct. App.
1957); People v. Jordan, 37 Misc.2d 33, 234 N.Y.S.2d 323, 326-27 (Orleans
County Ct. 1962); State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 402 P.2d 741, 743 (1965).
97. Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962); United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d 341, 345
(7th Cir. 1949); Smith v. United States, 2 F.2d 715, 716 (4th Cir. 1924);
People v. Gibson, 220 Cal. App.2d 15, 33 Cal. Rptr. 775, 780 (1963); People
v. Beverly, 200 Cal. App.2d 119, 125, 19 Cal. Rptr. 67, 71 (1962); Alire v.
People, 402 P.2d 610, 612 (Colo. 1965); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.
2d 895, 896 (Ky. 1965); Shipley v. State, 243 Md. 262, 220 A.2d 585, 588
(1966); People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419, 124 N.W.2d 269, 273 (1963); People v. Jordan, 37 Misc.2d 33, 234 N.Y.S.2d 323, 326 (Orleans County Ct.
1962); State v. Griffin, 84 N.J. Super. 508, 202 A.2d 856, 861 (1964); Smith
v. State, 155 Tenn. 40, 290 S.W. 4, 5 (1927). Contra, State v. Charbonneau,
CR.4-10315 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1965) (opinion unreported); Pruitt v. State,
389 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex. Cr. App. 1965).
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mits him in the discharge of his duties to enter a vehicle, as when
he does so to make an arrest, 8 or to assist a motorist with a defective windshield wiper, 99 or to protect the vehicle's contents from
the weather,100 then his activities therein will not be classified
as a search,' 0' at least not an unreasonable one. But, when he enters to search, then anything he does after such entry, no matter
how slight, will be so classified. 0 2
While not discussed in many cases, the issue of search of a
pursued vehicle deserves some mention. The courts that have
passed upon this have taken some interesting positions. Thus, one
court has ruled that the search begins when the pursuit begins.'
Another, while not going quite this far, has held that the search
commences "at the time the officers move in to overhaul the
driver."'0 4 Although the position taken by these courts might
seem, at first blush, to be extreme, they are but an example of the
broad concept of search in action-a concept, as we have seen, that
places strong emphasis upon the mental processes of the searcher.

VII. ARE

OBSERVATIONS, CONDUCTED WITH OR WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
VISUAL AIDS, SEARCHES?

A. Introduction
We have analyzed the meanings of search under the fourth
amendment, and when such searches take place. It is now perti98. Mosley v. United States, 209 A.2d 796, 797 (D.C. App. 1965).
99. State v. Brindley, 25 Conn. Supp. 216, 218, 200 A.2d 247, 248 (1963).
100. Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir. 1965);
Harris v. United States, 370 F.2d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
101. State v. Brindley, 25 Conn. Supp. 216, 221, 200 A.2d 247, 249
(1963); Mosley v. United States, 209 A.2d at 797-98 (D.C. App. 1965);
cf. United States v. Washington, 249 F. Supp. 40, 41, 42 (D.D.C. 1965) (not
unreasonable to check glove compartment for vehicle's registration, after
defendant had been arrested for traffic offense, and then discover therein,
in plain view, evidence of an unrelated offense). But see People v. Lee,
371 Mich. 563, 124 N.W.2d 736, 738 (1963).
102. State v. Brindley, supra note 101; People v. Jordan, 37 Misc.2d
33, 234 N.Y.S.2d 323, 327 (Orleans County Ct. 1962) (noting that once the
officer reached into the vehicle to withdraw what appeared to be a revolver, he was engaging in a search); cf. Taylor v. Commonwealth,
394 S.W.2d 895, 896 (Ky. 1965). In Jordan, the court had earlier observed
that it was not a search for police officers to stand by defendant's stopped
vehicle and look into its interior illuminated by the headlights and searchlight of their cruiser. It was this illumination which revealed the presence
of what "appeared" to be a revolver underneath a cushion on the front
seat. The court felt that reaching into the car satisfied the narrow concept of search which it endorsed, because only after doing this had the
officer brought to light that which the defendant had intended to keep
hidden from view. The opinion emphasized the fact that prior to reaching
in, the officer could only say that the object "appeared" to be a revolver. He was unable to confirm this suspicion until after he had intruded into the vehicle's interior. 234 N.Y.S.2d at 326-27.
103. Terry v. State, 252 Miss. 479, 173 So.2d 889, 891 (1965); Smith v.
State, 240 Miss. 738, 128 So.2d 857, 859 (1961).
104. Saltsman v. State, 243 P.2d 737, 741 (Okla. Cr. App. 1952).
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nent to discuss whether certain activity, in particular, observations
made by law enforcement officers, with or without benefit of
visual aids, are searches for fourth-amendment purposes. In short,
our inquiry will now be directed to a determination of whether
visual observations are part of the search process.
Such observations, for the purposes of this article, will be classified as "functional," as distinguished from the more accidental
type, which may be classified as "random." What has given rise
to this issue is not only the frequency and factual diversity of observations in search and seizure cases, as well as their role in being
instrumental in many prosecutions, 0 5 but also the realization by
105.

For the factual diversity involved, as well as the critical role

played by such observations in leading to subsequent prosecution, see, for
example, Lipton v. United States, 348 F.2d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1965) (as a result of a routine license check, defendant was prosecuted for knowingly
transporting in interstate commerce a stolen vehicle); Fagundes v. United
States, 340 F.2d 673, 674 (1st Cir. 1965) (as a result of the arrest of another
individual, defendant was prosecuted for armed robbery); Schook v. United
States, 337 F.2d 563, 565 (8th Cir. 1964) (although arrested for "suspicion
of burglary," defendant was prosecuted for unlawfully transporting a firearm in interstate commerce); Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 329
(9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962) (although defendant's vehicle was stopped because its license plate was not illuminated, he was
prosecuted for the illegal possession of an unregistered firearm); Riggins v.
United States, 255 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Tex. 1966) (as a result of the
stoppage of a motorist for having only one license plate on his vehicle, he
was prosecuted by federal authorities for violations of the National Firearms Act); People v. Robinson, 62 Cal.2d 889, 44 Cal. Rptr. 762, 402 P.2d
834, 835 (1965) (while defendant-motorist was stopped for intoxication, he
was prosecuted for forgery); Alire v. People, 402 P.2d 610, 611 (Colo. 1965)
(a narcotics prosecution that grew out of the stoppage of a motorist for
careless driving); State v. Cuellar, 25 Conn. Supp. 229, 231, 200 A.2d 729,
730 (1964) (although stopped for erratic operation of his vehicle, defendant
was prosecuted for larceny); State v. Brindley, 25 Conn. Supp. 216, 218,
200 A.2d 247, 248 (1963) (although stopped for operating a vehicle with a
defective windshield wiper, defendant was prosecuted for possessing burglars' tools); White v. United States, 222 A.2d 843, 844 (D.C. App. 1966)
(a larceny prosecution that grew out of an investigatory inquiry); People
v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419, 124 N.W.2d 269, 271 (1963) (although defendant's vehicle was stopped for not having its license plate illuminated, he
was prosecuted for illegally transporting or possessing a deer); Smith v.
State, 240 Miss. 738, 128 So.2d 857, 858 (1961) (prosecution for possession
of burglary tools that grew out of stopping defendant's vehicle for speeding); State v. Griffin, 84 N.J. Super. 508, 202 A.2d 856, 858 (1964) (a larceny prosecution that grew out of a "courtesy" stop to advise defendant
that a left turn his vehicle had taken was dangerous); People v. Rivera,
14 N.Y.2d 441, 444, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461, 201 N.E.2d 32, 34 (1964), cert.
(a prosecution for
denied, Rivera v. New York, 379 U.S. 978 (1965)
unlawful possession of a concealed weapon that grew out of a "suspicion"
detention); People v. Jordan, 37 Misc.2d 33, 234 N.Y.S.2d 323, 325 (Orleans County Ct. 1962) (a prosecution for illegal possession of a firearm that grew out of a routine license check); State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521,
402 P.2d 741, 742 (1965) (a prosecution for illegal possession of a concealed
weapon that grew out of a stoppage of defendant's vehicle for defective tail
lights); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 208 Pa. Super. 323, 325, 222 A.2d 495,
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the courts that the search process
necessarily involves, with rare
10 7
exception, 06 the function of sight.
B. Authorities Denying that Observations, not made by Trespass, are Searches
Although it is clear that the search process can involve the
function of sight, the majority of cases that have passed upon this
issue have refused to classify observations as searches, provided
they are not made during the commision of a trespass upon a constitutionally protected area. 08 Nor will the use of visual aids to
assist such observations affect the result. 0 9 Thus, it has been held
497 (1966) (a narcotics prosecution that grew out of a stoppage of defendant's vehicle for erratic operation and having its lights on high beam);
Pruitt v. State, 389 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Cr. App. 1965) (a prosecution for
unlawful transportation of wine in a "dry area" that grew out of a routine
license check); State v. Brown, 25 Wis.2d 413, 130 N.W.2d 760, 762 (1964)
(a narcotics prosecution that grew out of an arrest for driving on the
wrong side of the street); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis.2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264,
265 (1964) (a narcotics prosecution that grew out of the stoppage of a
motorist for a brakelight violation). In each of these cases, the subsequent
prosecution for a far more serious crime arose as a direct result of the
observations made by law enforcement officers while either making an
arrest for a less significant offense, or while conducting a detention inquiry prompted by suspicion, or while stopping a vehicle for a minor
traffic offense. Clearly, then, such observations have played, and are
playing, an important role in the criminal law, and, in particular, in the
law of search and seizure.
106. As, for example, a wire tap, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 457, 464, 465-66 (1928), or electronic surveillance, e.g., Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506, 509-12 (1961).
107. People v. Sheridan, 236 Cal. App.2d 667, 46 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297
(1965); People v. Kramer, 38 Misc.2d 889, 239 N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (1963);
cf. People v. Amos, 190 Cal. App.2d 384, 11 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1961);
People v. West, 144 Cal. App.2d 214, 300 P.2d 729, 733 (1956).
108. E.g., United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); Fagundes v.
United States, 340 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir. 1965); Lundberg v. Buchkoe, 338
F.2d 62, 69 (6th Cir. 1964); Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 305 (9th
Cir. 1964); Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
Riggins v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Tex. 1966); People v.
Sheridan, 236 Cal. App.2d 667, 46 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297 (1965); People v.
Holloway, 230 Cal. App.2d 834, 41 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 (1964); People v.
Amos, 190 Cal. App. 2d 384, 11 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1961); People v. West,
144 Cal. App.2d 214, 300 P.2d 729, 733 (1956); Reid v. United States, 201
A.2d 867, 869 (D.C. App. 1964); People v. Alicki, 321 Mich. 701, 33 N.W.2d
124, 126 (1948); State v. Emerson, 266 Minn. 217, 123 N.W.2d 382, 384
(1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Bowers v. Rundle, 200 Pa. Super. 496, 499,
189 A.2d 910, 912 (1963); Gil v. State, 394 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. Cr. App.
1965); State v. Brown, 25 Wis.2d 413, 130 N.W.2d 760, 763 (1964); cf.
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 43 (1963); Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d
328, 331 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962). In fact, it has
been held that a search under the fourth amendment involves something
more than the ordinary use of the senses. United States v. Callahan, 256
F. Supp. 739, 745 (D. Minn. 1964).
109. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (dictum); On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952).
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that if a police officer shines a flashlight into the interior of a vehicle without physically entering it, he is not engaging in a
search. 110 Likewise, he may resort to the aid of bifocals, binoculars,
and telescopes."'
While these cases are not in agreement as to just what the observations are," 2 it is apparent that there is a twofold basis for
their refusal to characterize them as searches. In the first place,
these courts place critical emphasis upon the absence of a trespass.
As was seen above ' 3 the common law required a trespass before it
110. E.g., Petteway v. United States, 261 F.2d 53, 54 (4th Cir. 1958);
United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1949); Smith v. United
States, 2 F.2d 715, 716 (4th Cir. 1924); United States v. Callahan, 256 F.
Supp. 739, 745 (D. Minn. 1964); People v. Davis, 222 Cal. App.2d 75, 34
Cal. Rptr. 796, 797 (1963); People v. Gibson, 220 Cal. App.2d 15, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 775, 780 (1963); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.2d 895, 896 (Ky.
1965); People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419, 124 N.W.2d 269, 273 (1963); State
v. Griffin, 84 N.J. Super. 508, 202 A.2d 856, 861 (1964); People v. Hoffman,
24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (1965); People v. Anthony,
21 App. Div. 2d 666, 249 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (1964), cert. denied, Anthony
v. New York, 379 U.S. 983 (1965); State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 402 P.2d
741, 743 (1965); Smith v. State, 155 Tenn. 40, 290 S.W. 4, 5 (1927);
cf. Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 885 (1958); People v. Wright, 153 Cal. App.2d 35, 313 P.2d 868, 870
(1957); People v. Jordan, 37 Misc.2d 33, 234 N.Y.S.2d 323, 326 (Orleans
County Ct. 1962).
The reasoning behind these decisions has been explained thus:
The defendant Keating's truck was picked up on a public street
with stolen goods plainly visible to the officer by the aid of a
flashlight. The use of a flashlight to reveal what had been concealed by natural phenomena does not constitute an unlawful
invasion of Keating's rights. Police officers in dealing with investigation of crime are not required to blindfold themselves. If
it had been daylight, the stolen merchandise would have been
plainly visible. The blanket of night is not the privacy of the defendant. We do not think this constituted a search, but if it did,
it was not an unreasonable search.
United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1949). (Emphasis
supplied.)
111. See cases cited supra note 109.
112. For example, some authorities have held that they are not searches
at all. E.g., United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); State v. Griffin,
84 N.J. Super. 508, 202 A.2d 856, 861 (1964).
Others have referred to
them as "mere inspections." E.g., Smith v. State, 155 Tenn. 40, 290 S.W. 4,
5 (1927). Still others have characterized them as not being "unreasonable"
or "illegal" searches. E.g., People v. Alicki, 321 Mich. 701, 33 N.W.2d 124,
126 (1948); People v. Anthony, 21 App. Div. 2d 666, 249 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999
(1964), cert. denied, Anthony v. New York, 379 U.S. 983 (1965); but see
People v. Hoffman, 24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (1965),
where in the same court noted that such observations were not searches.
See also United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1949),
wherein the court could not make up its mind as to exactly what they
were. It was sure of only one thing-they were not unreasonable. This
confusion is interesting, though, because if the observations are not searches
at all, then it is immaterial, for fourth-amendment purposes, whether they
be reasonable or not. See State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P.2d 535,
537 (1964).
113. See supra notes 9-28 and accompanying text.
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would concede the existence of a search, and the eye itself could
never be guilty of such a trespass."' 4 In short, the realm of privacy required a physical intrusion before the courts would say that
it had been invaded. Therefore, where an observation has been
made without benefit of such intrusion, it will not be classified as
a search."15 Secondly, implicit in the rulings of these cases is the
"open view" or "plain sight" rule. Simply stated, this rule holds
that there can be no search when one observes that which is in
open view. 16 Hence, the police are permitted, provided they make
no trespassory intrusion, to observe anything that is in open view.
If, however, something is hidden or covered, then to look for it
without satisfying any 1'of7 the protective requirements of the
amendment is "verboten. ""
The courts' reluctance to term such observations searches is
understandable for, as we have already seen, 118 the fruits of these
observations are almost always instrumental in leading to a successful prosecution. If they be suppressed, the prosecution will
undoubtedly come to an end."19
1. Representative Examples of Cases Denying the Existence
of a Search
In considering these cases it will be necessary to examine in
detail the bases for their rulings. In addition, the factual situations involved will require close analysis.
Ellison v. United States1 20 concerned observations made by
police officers after they had entered private property to investigate a crime. The officers had been notified earlier that a drugstore had been robbed of narcotics, drug products, and cigarettes.
Arriving at the scene of the crime, they conducted an investigation.
One of them thereupon recalled that "about a year earlier" defendant had committed a similar offense in the general area and
that his home was nearby. From this, he surmised that defendant
114. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765).
115. People v. Holloway, 230 Cal. App.2d 834, 41 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328
(1964); Gil v. State, 394 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. Cr. App. 1965).
116. E.g., Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir. 1965);
Lundberg v. Buchkoe, 338 F.2d 62, 69 (6th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Williams, 314 F.2d 795, 798 (6th Cir. 1963); Petteway v. United States,
261 F.2d 53, 54 (4th Cir. 1958); Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1953); Smith v. United States, 2 F.2d 715, 716 (4th Cir. 1924);
People v. Sheridan, 236 Cal. App.2d 667, 46 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297 (1965);
State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 402 P.2d 741, 743 (1965); Commonwealth v.
Anderson, 208 Pa. Super. 323, 327, 222 A.2d 495, 497-98 (1966); State v.
Brown, 25 Wis.2d 413, 130 N.W.2d 760, 763 (1964).
117. State v. Brown, supra note 116.
118. See authorities listed in note 105, supra.
119. In State v. Charbonneau, CR.4-10315 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1965) (opinion unreported), this is exactly what happened.
120. 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

Spring 1967]

LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE

might have committed the offense under investigation. Acting
upon this possibility, the officers went to defendant's home, where
his mother advised that she would check to see if he was at home.
While waiting on the front porch, one of the officers observed some
drugstore bottles and cigarettes, "and other things" lying on the
ground near the house. He noticed that the objects had the appearance of having been recently put there.
On the basis of these observations, the officers arrested defendant for the robbery. Prior to trial, a motion to suppress was
filed and denied.
The court of appeals, in sustaining the denial, ruled that the
officers, in going upon defendant's property, were not trespassers as
they were conducting an investigation of a crime; 121 that, consequently, they were guilty of no impropriety resulting in any invasion of his privacy when they observed the bottles and
cigarettes;
122
and that such observations did not constitute searches.
On the surface, the court appeared to be correct when it ruled
that the observations were not searches, because there was nothing
in the facts to indicate that at the time the bottles and cigarettes
were spotted, the officers were looking for anything. Their testimony certainly indicated no specific quest; therefore, the observations made would seem to fall into the haphazard, or accidental,
category.
The force of this reasoning dissolves upon closer analysis. In
the first place, we see police officers investigating a recent crime
that was similar to one previously committed by defendant in the
same area. Secondly, we discover that the officers recognized the
similarity. And, finally, we follow the officers to defendant's home.
This brings us to the critical question: Why did the officers go to
the home? Here, the officers themselves supplied the answer.
They went on the possibility that defendant had committed the
crime.
The mental processes thereby set in motion put the officers'
presence in proper perspective; now we see that they were in fact
on a quest-a quest for evidence of guilt that would satisfy their
suspicions already aroused. Therefore, taken in context, the sequence of events would strongly indicate that the observations
were part of a quest for incriminating evidence-in short, part of
the search process.
Where the opinion is even weaker is in its premise that peace
officers have a right to enter upon private premises while conducting a criminal investigation, even in the absence of probable cause;
because at the time the officers entered upon defendant's property,
they lacked probable cause. 123 Nor could their entry be justified on
121. Accord, Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450, 456 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
122. 206 F.2d at 478.

123.

The court, itself, apparently recognized this, because it ruled that

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

the ground of an emergency, or some other exceptional circumstance justifying entry without warrant into a constitutionally protected area. 12 4 It is submitted that in order to get around the trespass rule, which might have resulted in a condemnation of the observations as warrantless searches made without benefit of probable cause, the court created the fiction of non-trespass for investigating officers. 125

Upon close examination, the situation in Elli-

the information derived from the observations gave the officers probable
cause to arrest defendant. 206 F.2d at 478-79.
124. For a summary of such "exceptional circumstances," see Mascolo,
Inter-Spousal Consent to Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: A Constitutional Approach, 40 CONN. B.J. 351, 354 (1966).
125. The court might have been on safer ground had it characterized
the entry as a simple trespass, as distinguished from one that is made for
the purpose of search; for evidence is not rendered inadmissible merely
because it has been obtained as a result of a technical trespass upon private
property. United States v. Romano, 330 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 942 (1965); United States v. Sterling, 244 F. Supp. 534,
536 (W.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 799, 803 (3d Cir.
1966); cf. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) (dictum). This
does not mean, however, that the trespass is irrelevant to the concept of
reasonableness under the fourth amendment. What it does mean is that a
trespass will not render conduct impermissible, provided the trespass is
into or upon an area not constitutionally protected. Since the evidence
seized in Ellison was located on the grounds surrounding defendant's residence, the court could have ruled that the seizure was permissible because
the area was unprotected. See, for example, United States v. Sorce, 325
F.2d 84, 86 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 931 (1964); Martin v.
United States, 155 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1946). Thus we see the court
implicitly saying in Hester v. United States, supra, 265 U.S. at 59, that
since the amendment's protection does not extend "to the open fields,"
any evidence obtained therein, as a result of a physical intrusion, will not
be characterized as the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Additionally, Hester has been interpreted to mean that "it is not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to observe in a public [or
any other unprotected area] place that is apparent for all the world to see."
Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 984 (1965). The public or semiprivate aspect of Hester has been
recognized by the Supreme Court itself, when it noted that since an occupied motor vehicle is not comparable to an open field, it can hardly be
said that a passenger has abandoned a package that he allows to fall to the
floor of the vehicle. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 n.6 (1960).
While Ellison, 206 F.2d at 478, n.3, does cite Hester for the proposition that
mere observation does not constitute a search for fourth-amendment purposes, this is only a semitruth. Such observation will not fall within the
ambit of the amendment, provided it is made from an unprotected area
and is directed at another area also unprotected, as was the case in
Hester; or it is directed at a protected area, and is accomplished without a
physical intrusion. Cf. Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir.
1955). And, as is also well known, if peace officers lawfully enter private
premises and see incriminating evidence lying about, or in open view, they
may lawfully seize the same. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 43 (1963),
and authorities cited therein; Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 489-90 (Del.
1967) (because the preservation of human life takes precedence over the
right to privacy, police officers may lawfully enter a residence without
warrant, in response to an emergency call, and seize evidence of crime
lying about in open view; such entry violates no right of privacy); State
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son is seen to be not too dissimilar from that which existed in
Silverman v. United States.126 It should be remembered that the
"innocent" observations in Ellison were made only as a result of
the warrantless entry without probable cause, and for this reason
should have been suppressed. 127 There is no appreciable difference
between Ellison and the rule that characterizes as fourth-amendment searches those
observations made by commission of a tres128
passory intrusion.

In Busby v. United States,"29 "suspicious" men were observed
in an automobile in the early hours of the morning. Suspecting
v. Puryear, 94 N.J. Super. 125, 227 A.2d 139, 144 (1967) (police officers, responding to an emergency call that gas fumes were emanating from an
apartment, may lawfully seize gambling paraphernalia lying about in open
view). Furthermore, if the officers are able to view into a constitutionally
protected area, whether by means of the naked eye or with the aid of an
optical instrument, their conduct will not be condemned, provided, in so
viewing, they do not physically intrude into the protected area. E.g., United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (turning a searchlight on the open
decks of a boat, prior to boarding the same, is not a search); United States
v. Sterling, supra, 369 F.2d at 802 (observations made by a law enforcement officer from unoccupied premises adjoining the property of defendant are not illegal searches).
126. 365 U.S. 505, 506-07 (1961). It must be acknowledged, however,
that in Silverman the intrusion was made for the purpose of search,
whereas no such purpose patently appears from the facts in Ellison.
127. In this regard, it has been held that the fruits of observations
made by police officers after gaining illegal entry to a constitutionally protected area, will be suppressed. E.g., McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d
598, 603 (1st Cir. 1955); Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, 489 (D.C.
Cir. 1959); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291, 294 (10th Cir. 1965);
Presley v. Pepersack, 228 F. Supp. 95, 104 (D. Md. 1964); Duncan v. State,
278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840, 855 (1965); State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406
P.2d 208, 214 (1965); State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365, 369
(1962); People v. O'Neill, 14 N.Y.2d 148, 153-54, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420, 182
N.E.2d 95, 98 (1962); cf. Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325, 328 n.5 (8th
Cir. 1965) (recognizing the existence of the rule), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944
(1965). Interestingly enough, although these cases do not refer to the observations themselves as searches, this would appear, nevertheless, to be
implicit in their rulings.
Additionally, it cannot be seriously contended that a front porch of a
residence is not a constitutionally protected area. Cf. Brock v. United
States, 223 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1955). See also authorities listed in
note 23, supra. Therefore, since the officers in Ellison had physically intruded into a protected area, the fruits of their observations made from
such vantage point should have been suppressed, even though the evidence
they saw might have been located in an unprotected area. Cf. United
States ex rel. Stoner v. Myers, 219 F. Supp. 908, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1963),
aff'd, 329 F.2d 280, 282-83, 284 (3d Cir. 1964), wherein the court, relying
upon Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), observed that law enforcement officers lawfully on private premises may seize fruits of a crime
lying about in open view. Although the officers in Hester were not lawfully on private premises at the time they observed fruits of a crime, both
their observations and the fruits seized were in unprotected areas.
128. See, in particular, State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 402 P.2d 741, 743
(1965), and cases cited therein.
129. 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962).
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that they planned to rob a bar and restaurant, as there were circumstances pointing in this direction, a police officer, after noting
that the vehicle was operating without one of its plates being
illuminated, pulled it over to the curb and asked to see the operator's license. Although the operator was unable to produce one, a
passenger, who claimed to be the owner, produced his. Meanwhile,
a second officer arrived on the scene. This officer had been told
by the bartender that one of the men in the vehicle had inquired
earlier in the evening what the bartender would do if he, Busby,
stuck a "heater" in his face. The bartender further related that
Busby later attempted to enter the bar after closing hours. After
arriving on the scene, this officer ordered the occupants out of
the vehicle. When they opened the doors to step out, the interior
dome light went on, thereby revealing a sawed-off shotgun lying in
the rear of the vehicle. Prior to this discovery, neither officer had
knowledge of the commission of any offense other than the license
plate offense. It was for the illegal possession of this weapon that
defendant was prosecuted. At no time prior to this discovery did
either officer enter the vehicle.
Relying upon a California statute, 13 0 which defined an arrest
as "taking a person into custody," the court ruled that no arrest
took place until after the weapon was disclosed.'13 It further felt
that neither the stopping of the vehicle
nor the order to step out
132
constituted an arrest under the statute.
In passing upon the search question, the court ruled that no
search had taken place, because the officers had not sought to find
anything in the vehicle, had made no attempt to enter it, and had
done nothing except to look at what had been revealed by the
illumination cast by the dome light. 3s
Once again we have a case whose surface facts would seem to
indicate a correct decision. Certainly, there can be no argument
with the court's reliance upon the California arrest statute. 3 4 But
are the facts as deceptively simple as they seem to appear? Is
there not lurking here, although not on the surface, a contemplated
quest? The court did not think so, and felt it was proper for the
officers, in conducting a "routine investigation," to require defendant and his companions to step out of their vehicle. 35 Although
it concluded that such actions were reasonable, the court gave no
reasons in support thereof.
130. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834.
131. 296 F.2d at 331.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid. The court also noted that what the light revealed gave the
officers probable cause for an arrest.
134. See United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,
305-06 (1958); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963); United States v.
Fortier, 207 F. Supp. 516, 518 (D. Conn. 1962).
135. 296 F.2d at 331-32.
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The question becomes, therefore, why was it necessary, in conducting a "routine investigation" of an unreported crime, to require the occupants to get out of their vehicle? In line with this, it
must be remembered that the officer who ordered this was not the
one who had stopped them for the license plate offense; but was,
on the contrary, the one who had received the potentially incriminating information from the bartender. In fact, the court made no
attempt to justify the order as an adjunct to the license plate offense. Therefore, this order can be relevant to only one fact: the
officer intended to conduct a search, i.e., a quest, for weapons-at
least for the weapon that Busby had brandished in the bartender's face. It was only because of a fortuitous circumstance
that this contemplated search was never required. The fact that
Busby's weapon apparently was never found is without moment. 136
The important factor is what the officer was looking for, or intended to look for.
The facts in Busby clearly show that the officers were motivated at all times by a desire to search, which, in turn, was
prompted by suspicion. In short, the vehicle was stopped and its
occupants ordered out solely at the "whim, caprice or mere suspicion" of the officers, which is impermissible.1 37 Therefore, anything seen thereafter should have been
suppressed as the fruits of
1 38
an illegal search for evidence of crime.
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Anderson,'39 the court was faced
with the following factual situation: Two police officers, while
patrolling at night in a cruiser, saw a vehicle being operated in an
erratic manner, and with its lights on high beam. After stopping
it to determine the condition of the driver, they concluded that he
was not intoxicated. However, one of the officers recognized the
driver as a "known" narcotics violator. While checking his license
and registration, and while talking to him, they noticed, by means
of a flashlight, a cylindrical shaped object wrapped in brown paper
that was protruding from under the vehicle's front seat.
Thereupon, they "asked" the driver to accompany them to the
station for "investigation." At that time, no attempt had been
made by the officers to remove the package from the vehicle. Upon
136. In law, a search is good or bad when it starts. It does not change
character from its results. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927);
Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 68, 190 A.2d 304, 310-11 (1963),
cert. denied, Bosurgi v. Commonwealth, 375 U.S. 910 (1963). As to the
information needed to satisfy the requirements of probable cause, a court
will examine only those existing at the time the search commences.
Cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1961) (same rule for an
arrest); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964) (same for the issuance of a search warrant). In short, the legality of a search is determined
at the point of its commencement. People v. Hobbs, 50 Misc.2d 561, 270
N.Y.S.2d 732, 737 (Monroe County Ct. 1966).
137. See authorities listed in note 35, supra.
138. See authorities listed in notes 127 and 79, supra.
139. 208 Pa. Super. 323, 222 A.2d 495 (1966).
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arriving at the station, the driver locked his car. Shortly thereafter, a search was made of the vehicle, and it was then determined
14
that the package contained narcotic instruments and drugs. 1
On defendant's appeal, the court first considered the propriety
of the officers' actions in stopping the vehicle, and concluded that
they were necessary for the protection of users of public highways.
for the officers to conduct a liTherefore, it was also reasonable
14 1
cense and registration check.

The opinion then proceeded to the question of the observations
made with the aid of the flashlight and quoted with approval the
"open view" or "plain sight" doctrine announced in one of its
earlier decisions. 142 Realizing, however, that the cylindrical package in question, which, it will be recalled, was wrapped in brown
aper, did not meet the requirements of the doctrine, the court was
compelled to emphasize the importance of the officer's recognition
of defendant as a "known" narcotics violator. From this it rationalized that such knowledge was sufficient for the officer to "infer
contents to give him reasonable
its [the package's] contraband1 43
cause to investigate its contents.
The court's reasoning went in this vein:
[T] he officers acted with great prudence. They could have
arrested the appellant for a vehicular code violation then
and there, but having seen the suspicious package decided
to complete the investigation at the police station. To let
the automobile go would invite the destruction of the contraband and the courts have made a distinction as regards
of search between buildings and motor vereasonableness
14 4
hicles.
The opinion proceeded to quote extensively from a prior opin140. Although a claim of consent was made in this case, 208 Pa. Super.
at 328-29, 222 A.2d at 497, 498-99, that issue is beyond the scope of this
article and is not germane to our discussion. It would be, of course, to
the validity of an incidental search. As to the permissive limits of such a
search, see, for example, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152-55
(1947); Commonwealth v. Harris, 209 Pa. Super. 27, 33, 223 A.2d 881, 883
(1966). As to when those limits have been exceeded, see, e.g., James v.
Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 37 (1965); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
367 (1964); Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346, 347 (1957); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 31 (1925); United States v. McCunn, 40 F.2d
295, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); United States v. Zarra, 258 F. Supp. 713, 716
(M.D. Pa. 1966); People v. Cruz, 61 Cal.2d 861, 395 P.2d 889, 891 (1964);
People v. Parisi, 42 Misc.2d 607, 249 N.Y.S.2d 493, 497 (Oneida County Ct.
1964); Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 421 Pa. 169, 182, 218 A.2d 249, 256-57
(1966).
141. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 208 Pa. Super. at 326, 222 A.2d at
497.
142. Commissioner ex rel. Bowers v. Rundle, 200 Pa. Super. 496, 499,
189 A.2d 910, 912 (1963).
143. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 208 Pa. Super. at 326, 222 A.2d at
497. (Emphasis added.)
144. 208 Pa. Super. at 326, 222 A.2d at 498. (Emphasis added.)
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ion 145 concerning the definitions of a search and seizure, property
lying in open view, and abandoned property. 146 It also discussed
the concept of reasonableness under the fourth amendment, noting that "'state courts are still free to apply their own, rather
than the federal, criteria of "reasonableness" .. 7
Finally, the court ruled that defendant's arrest was not effected until after the police had
taken possession of the package
148
and had learned of its contents.
It has been necessary to give a virtual "blow-by-blow" description of Anderson, because it is difficult to conceive of a search
and seizure case more replete with errors, misconceptions, and rules
misapplied.
In the first place, the court completely misapplied the "open
view" rule. 49 The facts were devoid completely of any rational
basis for such application. The package's contents were not in
open view, but effectively concealed. For this reason alone, the
officers were unable to make the narcotics arrest until after the
brown paper covering the package had been removed. Only then
was there something in plain view.
Secondly, the court completely misconstrued the officers' actions after they had completed their license and registration check,
and had determined that defendant was not intoxicated. If it be
conceded that the officers had a right to stop defendant because
of his operation of the vehicle, this concession must end with the
conclusion made by the officers that he was not intoxicated. Additionally, there was no basis for a continued license and registration inquiry, because apparently both were in order. So, what is
the basis for the court's contention that defendant could have been
arrested "for a vehicular code violation then and there," if the
officers had chosen not to act "with great prudence?" If the officers had decided to act with imprudence by placing defendant
under arrest "then and there" for such erratic operation, what
145. Commonwealth v. Calvarese, 199 Pa. Super. 319, 322, 185 A.2d
657, 659 (1962).
146. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 208 Pa. Super. at 327, 222 A.2d at 498.
147. 208 Pa. Super. at 328, 222 A.2d at 498, quoting from Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 65, 190 A.2d 304, 309 (1963), cert. denied,
Bosurgi v. Commonwealth, 375 U.S. 910 (1963).
148. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 208 Pa. Super. at 328, 222 A.2d
at 498. For general accord with Anderson, and on facts somewhat similar,
see Alire v. People, 402 P.2d 610, 613 (Colo. 1965).
149. For authorities that have correctly interpreted and applied the
rule, see note 116 supra. For a result diametrically opposite to that in
Anderson, see Nichols v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 189, 191-92 (Ky. 1966),
wherein it was held that marijuana contained in an open sack is not in
plain view when a police officer is able to identify it only after putting
his hand into the sack, removing some of its contents, and thereafter
examining the same. See also United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp. 256,
267 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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would this have accomplished? It certainly would not have permitted an incidental search of the vehicle.150 Nor would it have
gained them anything tinder even those authorities permitting an
incidental search for weapons of motorists arrested for traffic violations. 151 Anderson was arrested for what the package contained,
not for what he was carrying on his person. The only logical
conclusion that can be drawn from all of the officers' actions after
they had concluded that defendant was not intoxicated and that
his papers were in order is that they were searching for evidence
of some offense. Yet, the court refused to so characterize their
actions.
The court also misconstrued the application of reasonableness,
under the fourth amendment, to motor vehicles. That application,
recognizing the mobile nature of such objects, "relaxed the requirements for a [search] warrant on grounds of practicality. It
did not dispense with the need for probable cause. 1 5 2 Here, by
no stretch of the imagination could it be seriously contended that
the officers had probable cause prior to the actual physical search
of the package. Mere knowledget15 of defendant's prior narcotics
violations would not be sufficient," 4 nor would the mere presence
of a covered cylindrical shaped package in a motor vehicle. To rule
otherwise would be "to hold that anyone with a previous criminal
record could be arrested at will."' 5 To "infer" the existence of
contraband from "support so scant as this record presents" 156 would
15
reduce probable cause below even the standards of suspicion.
Anderson placed great reliance upon Commonwealth v. Calvarese,158 which in turn relied upon Haerr v. United States.15 9
This reliance is completely misplaced. Haerr involved the stoppage
of a vehicle at an Immigration Patrol checking station fourteen
miles from the border. Although the officers shined a flashlight
into the interior of the vehicle, they discovered nothing. As they
attempted a further investigation, the vehicle suddenly pulled
away. While pursuing it, the officers observed two boxes thrown
out from its right side. When they retrieved them, they discovered
that the boxes contained marihuana. Thus, Haerr was concerned
with two situations that are not covered under the amendment,
150.

See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.

151. E.g., authorities listed in notes 57 and 58, supra.
152. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959).
(Emphasis
added). Accord, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
153. The court's opinion never indicated what was the basis for this
"knowledge."
154. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 93, 95, 97 (1964).
155. Id. at 97.
156. Id. at 95.
157. Cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959).
158. 199 Pa. Super. 319, 322, 185 A.2nd 657, 659 (1962).
159. 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957). It should be noted that Haerr
adopted the broad concept of search-a fact that apparently made little
impression upon the court in Anderson.
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viz., (1) border searches'6 6 and (2) abandoned property."'" In
162
fact, it has been so interpreted.
Furthermore, the court in Anderson was in error when it
claimed that the states are still free to apply their own criteria of
reasonableness for search and seizure. This simply is not so, because the standard of reasonableness is the same under both the
fourth and fourteenth amendments. 163 It is true that the states
may develop "workable rules governing arrests, searches and
seizures,' 1

64

provided that these rules do not violate the fourth

amendment-in short, they must not dip below fourth-amendment
standards. 1 65 But this is not the same as developing criteria of
reasonableness. The criteria of reasonableness are those laid down
by the Supreme Court in construing the fourth amendment. As
long as state search and seizure rules meet these standards, they
will pass muster under the amendment. Ultimately, the question
of whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure is
one of federal, not state, law.'66
Finally, under both the narrow and broad concepts of arrest, 6 7
it would appear that Anderson was in error when it ruled that
the arrest did not take place until after the police had taken possession of the package and had learned of its actual contents.
Under either concept, the arrest took place, at the latest, at the
moment defendant was required to accompany the officers to the
160. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)
Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
U.S. 936 (1964); Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129, 131 (9th
Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
U.S. 977 (1961); King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754, 756 (5th

(dictum);
denied, 377
Cir. 1962);
denied, 366
Cir. 1958),

cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959).

161. E.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960); United States
v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942, 947 (N.D. Cal. 1963); Commonwealth v. Coyle,
415 Pa. 379, 397, 203 A.2d 782, 791 (1964); State v. Barr, 223 A.2d 462,
467 (Vt. 1966); cf. Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983, 989 (8th
Cir. 1965).
162. Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63, 66 (9th Cir. 1961).
163. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 110 (1964); Green v. Yeager, 223 F. Supp. 544, 549 (D.N.J. 1963),
alf'd, 332 F.2d 794 (3rd Cir. 1964); LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
THE

SUPREME

COURT:

A

STUDY

IN

CONSTITUTIONAL

169 (1966); SOBEL, op. cit. supra note 95, at 8, 10.
164. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).

INTERPRETATION

165,

165. Ibid.; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964); United States v.

Rundle, 337 F.2d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 1964); Nelson v. Hancock, 239 F. Supp.
857, 868 (D.N.H. 1965); United States v. Grosso, 225 F. Supp. 161, 165 (W.D.
Pa. 1964); Green v. Yeager, 223 F. Supp. 544, 549 (D.N.J. 1963); State v.
Licari, 153 Conn. 127, 133, 214 A.2d 900, 903 (1965); State v. Towry, 26
Conn. Supp. 35, 39, 210 A.2d 455, 458 (1965); State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504,

213 A.2d 185, 186 (1965). See also Cooper v. California, 87 Sup. Ct. 788
(1967) (dictum). Cf. Chapman v. California, 87 Sup. Ct. 824, 826 (1967).
166. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960).
167. 2ee discussion, supra notes 61-64 and accompanying test.
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station. 168 Thus, if the flashlight observation be considered a
search, then it must fail on two scores. First, it was made without
probable cause, and, second, it was made without benefit of a supporting valid arrest. On the other hand, if this observation not be
considered a search, the later physical one must still fall because
it was not made as an incident of the arrest effected by defendant
being required to go to the station.
2.

Critique of Authorities Denying the Existence of a Search
a. Historical Background

By its very nature, a search is not static. It is a continuing
functional process, and it lends itself to no easy definition. It is
complicated by the variables of circumstance, place, time and, ultimately, reasonableness. And if the concept of reasonableness is
relatively fixed, its application is not.
The law of search and seizure has been interwoven, in historical context, with the requirement of trespassory intrusion.
Attaching to the search process the requirement of a trespassory
intrusion of necessity eliminates therefrom all activity that does not
involve or include such intrusion. If the common law, which
guided the framers of the amendment, looked for an intrusion, it
was because, in part, this was the only type of search it knew. 169
But the reason therefor went deeper than this. The general search
warrant for seditious libel was used extensively in England from
the middle of the sixteenth to well into the eighteenth century.
It had for its purpose the indiscriminate hunt or quest for all
papers thought to be, or suspected of being, critical of the monarchy. Since it was illegal to possess these documents, their owners
were compelled to publish them in secret places, or in the privacy
of their homes. Consequently, the king's messengers, in order to
confiscate such libels, had to actually invade the home. But to accomplish this, the messengers had to violate the ancient right
embodied in the maxim, "A man's house is his castle."'' 0 It was
in his celebrated opinion
this factor that so disturbed Lord Camden
172
1 1
in the case of Entick v. Carrington.7 But, as we have seen,
168. See United States ex rel. Krogness v. Gladden, 242 F. Supp. 499,
500 (D. Or. 1965); State v. Krogness, 238 Or. 135, 388 P.2d 120, 122 (1963),
cert. denied, Krogness v. Oregon, 377 U.S. 992 (1964).
169. Cf. LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra note 163, at 200.
170. For a discussion of this history, see Marcus v. Search Warrant of
Property, etc., 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 55
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES

IN

HISTORICAL

AND

POLITICAL

24-34, 37-38, 42-51 (1937); LANDYNSKI, Op cit. supra note 163, at
20-24, 28-30, 54-55, 58-59.
171. 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 9 Eng. Rep. 807, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029,
1064-74 (C.P. 1765).
172. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
SCIENCE
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intrusion by trespass was a circumstance of aggravation. It did
not define the offense of unreasonable invasion of privacy. Rather,
it was a demonstrated example of how such personal security
could be invaded.
If we study history to learn of abuses in the law of search and
seizure, we find inspiration and revelation, but we also find ignorance. While historical analysis can demonstrate how others have
reacted in the past to known events with which they were familiar,
it can never show their reactions to circumstances of fact then
nonexistent. Historical analysis teaches by experience, not by invention.
b.

173
Modern Inventions

The invention of the automobile and flashlight has had a great
impact on the law of search and seizure, and has given to that law
a new dimension-a dimension that the founding fathers could not
have foreseen. With the advent of these phenomena, the search
process was no longer limited to crude physical intrusions into the
privacy of the home. Now, wherever the individual moved in his
newly found means of transportation, so, too, went the searcher.
Not only did the latter move with equal mobility, but he also traveled with newly discovered aids, one of which was the flashlight.
With the aid of the flashlight, the searcher was now able to
invade areas of privacy without resorting to the historical physical
intrusion so familiar to the common law. By the simple expedient
of shining a beam of light into the interior of a motor vehicle, he
was able to accomplish what his predecessors would not have been
able to do except by means of a physical intrusion. Although the
means of accomplishment were now different, the invasion of the
individual's security was as effectively accomplished in the one instance as it was in the other. The manner of intrusion was different, but not the result.
c.

The Importance of Mental Processes

The critical defect in these cases denying to observations the
status of search is their implicit insistence upon divorcing the
searcher from his mental processes. Thus, it serves no useful pur173. An extensive analysis of the impact of the invention of electronic
surveillance devices upon search and seizure law is beyond the scope of
this article. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court, in passing upon the
applicability of the amendment to a wire tap, ruled that such a device,
because of the absence of the factor of trespass, as well as the fact that
such a device was unknown to the common law, did not fall within the
ambit of a fourth amendment search. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 457, 464, 465-66 (1928). Contra, People v. Grossman, 45 Misc.2d 557,
257 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276-77 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (dictum). The Court has apparently abandoned the requirement of common law familiarity. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961).
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pose to dismiss all observations as non-searches. 1'7 4 Although observation can be the by-product of a search, it does not follow that
any observation will constitute a search. The axiom that mere visual observations is not per se a search is only the start of our inquiry, not its terminal. To announce the axiom is not to resolve
the issue raised by a claim of unreasonable search. For example,
implicit in any claim of unreasonable search by flashlight, or any
other visual aid, is the recognition that mere observation is distinguishable from search. The determining factor here will not
be the observation per se, but rather the mental processes of the
officer. Thus, if he engages in a mental quest for evidence of
crime, and if he relies upon his observations to assist in that quest,
then, surely, they should be classified as part of the quest itself.
In short, they should be designated as searches.
The critical factor in any search is the mental processes of the
searcher. He certainly must be looking for something, or have
something in mind, at or before the commencement of the search.
Viewed in this light, and keeping in mind that visual observation
may be the start of a search, 175 as where suspicious circumstances
prompt a law officer to look for evidence of crime, it can only lead
to confusion if one attempts to divorce the officer from his purpose.
Instead of peremptorily dismissing observations as non-searches, a
court should inquire as to the officer's purpose in making them.
What was he doing; why was he doing it; what was he looking
for?-these are the questions to which it should direct its inquiry.
If his purpose was to search, then let it be said so. Only after
such an inquiry can a court rationally understand the officer's
actions. Without it, such actions will remain disjointed and meaningless. If the mental processes are correlated to the purpose, and
if the purpose is correlated to the actions, then, and only then, will
the search process take on shape in the context of the factual
circumstances presented to a court.
This type of observation, which is used as an integral part of
the search process, might be referred to as functional observation,
for its function is to assist in such process. Naturally, there is
174. Cf. People v. Hobbs, 50 Misc.2d 561, 270 N.Y.S.2d 732, 737 (Monroe
County Ct. 1966), wherein the court, in determining whether certain observations fell within the search process, refused to be deterred by the "plain
view" doctrine. Rather, the court was concerned with the point at which a
search commences; and in making this inquiry, it was primarily interested
in the mental processes of the officers. After observing that the police officers went to defendant's residence to investigate a complaint, the court
conceived of a search in these terms:
[W]hatever they were doing on the premises their testimony made
it perfectly clear that they were investigating a complaint. Fundamentally, there can be no difference between 'investigation' and
'search.' To investigate implies careful inquiry, research, examination, systematic tracking, i.e., search.
270 N.Y.S. at 736.
175. People v. Kramer, 38 Misc.2d 889, 239 N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (Sup.
Ct. 1963).
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another type of observation which has nothing to do with the
search process, and this might be called random or accidental observation. Once again, the officer's mental processes are critical,
but for a reason entirely different from that in the realm of functional observation. In the case of random observation, there can be
no search because the mental processes have not been set in motion. For example, if an officer by happenstance comes upon evidence of crime, or, likewise, if he observes a crime being committed
then his observations will not fall into the category
in his presence,
7

of search.'

As we have seen, functional observation is prompted by a desire to seek, to look for-in short, a quest. It is not a random process. It is specific and is the end product of the mental process. A
typical example will involve a license and/or registration check of
a motorist at nighttime. The officer's curiosity has been aroused by
the manner of operation of the vehicle, or by the motorist's presence
at such an hour in such a locale. He pulls him over for a check,
and notes that the driver's papers are in order. But he doesn't
stop here; for, after finishing the check, he takes his flashlight
At this point, a court
and flashes it into the vehicle's interior.1'7
176. There would be no search if a police officer, while a guest in a

home, or after legally having been allowed or invited in, observed incriminating evidence or activities. Lewis v. United States, 87 Sup. Ct. 424,
427 (1966); Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1966);
Nichols v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1966). Cf. Robbins v.
MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 1966); Adams v. State, 143 So.2d 903,
904 (Fla. 1962); SOBEL, op. cit. supra note 95, at 48. And consider People
v. Capra, 17 N.Y.2d 670, 671, 269 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452, 216 N.E.2d 610, 611
(1966), where a neurologist, during an examination of defendant after he
had been injured in a motor vehicle accident, removed defendant's shoes
and socks to test the soles of his feet, when a packet of heroin fell out of the
right sock; cf. State v. Turner, 101 Ariz. 85, 416 P.2d 409, 411-12 (1966).
Although Capra could have been decided under the rule that does not apply
the amendment to searches conducted by private citizens, e.g., Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 476 (1921); United States v. Goldberg, 330
F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); United States v.
Frank, 225 F. Supp. 573, 575 (D.C. 1964), af 'd in part, rev'd in part on
condition, 347 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 923
(1965); Geniviva v. Bingler, 206 F. Supp. 81, 83 (W.D. Pa. 1961), the court
never referred to this rule in its opinion and characterized the doctor's
actions as not falling within the category of an illegal search. It would
seem, therefore, that Capra is authority for the proposition that what is
accidentally seen, or found, is not a part of, or the fruit of, the search
process. Nor does it appear that this result would have been altered by a
police officer's presence in the examining room, provided he was not there
for the purpose of conducting a search. See Vauss v. United States, 370
F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1966), wherein the court ruled that it is not illegal for

police officers, after discovering defendant lying unconscious in a public

street and being unable to arouse him, to search his person while waiting
for an ambulance, to secure possible identification in order to prepare a

report for the admitting hospital, and while so searching to accidentally
discover narcotics.
177.

See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 389 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Cr. App. 1965).
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should stop and temporarily disregard all subsequent activities of
the officer, and, in particular, what his light might reveal. It
should now commence its inquiry-an inquiry directed solely at the
officer's actions. Why did he flash his light? What was his purpose? What was he looking for? What relevancy did the use of
the flashlight have to the original purpose of stopping the motorist?
Why was it necessary to detain the driver beyond the check? These
are the inquiries that will bring to light what the officer was up to.
Obviously, he must have had something in mind. By making this
inquiry, a court will understand what the officer was conductinga SEARCH, a search that cannot pass muster under the fourth
amendment for several reasons. In the first place, it was conducted
without probable cause. Secondly, it was not incidental to a valid
arrest. In short, it was a general search for evidence of crime and
guilt. Nor would the result be changed by a check that revealed
that the driver's papers were not in order, for such an arrest would
not permit an incidental search of the vehicle, although it might
permit one of the driver's person for weapons.
Implicit in those cases that have refused to attach the status of
search to such observations is the realization by the courts that to
do so would lead to a suppression of the evidence thereby obtained; for such observations could never hope to pass the test of
reasonableness demanded by the fourth amendment. Without the
benefit of such evidence, the prosecution would collapse. This is
especially borne out by the fact that the fruits of such observations
have given officers of the law the required probable cause that was
previously lacking. 17 Also, by not characterizing functional observation as a search, these courts afford the prosecution the benefit
of the rule that presumes law officers to have acted within their
authority, in the absence of a prima facie showing of an illegal
search. 17 9 In permitting such activity to go unnoticed, they leave
the individual at the mercy of the police by effectively removing
him from the protection he would otherwise have under the amendment. By exempting such activity from the amendment, they deny
the protection to those most in need of it-those individuals who
178. E.g. Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328, 331, 332 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 876 (1962); United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d 341, 345
(7th Cir. 1949); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 208 Pa. Super. 323, 326, 222
A.2d 495, 497 (1966) (by implication); State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 402 P.2d
741, 743 (1965) (by implication); Smith v. State, 155 Tenn. 40, 290 S.W. 4, 5
(1927); cf. Rios v .United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960) (if contraband is
voluntarily revealed by defendant, then there is probable cause to arrest).
179. E.g., People v. Pruitt, 155 Cal. App.2d 585, 318 P.2d 552, 559 (1957);
People v. Holguin, 145 Cal. App. 2d 520, 522, 302 P.2d 635, 637 (1956); State
v. Brindley, 25 Conn. Supp. 216, 220, 200 A.2d 247, 249 (1963). If, on the

other hand, the officers have acted illegally, i.e., without probable cause,

their actions will not be saved, even if it be assumed that they were motivated by "good faith." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); State v. Macri, 39 N.J. 250, 188 A.2d
389, 393, 397 (1963).
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have not given the police probable cause to act. It is no justification to say that the "blanket of night is not the privacy of the
defendant,"'' 0 for it is not the "blanket of night" that is being invaded. In giving sanction to functional observation, these cases
have allowed an effective invasion of the right of every individual
to personal security and privacy. This right encompasses the
right to be let alone, the right to be free from a prying sovereignin short, the right to be free of the odious general search. 18l It is
this blanket of privacy that is being invaded when police officers
are permitted to search by visual observation. In order to give
continuing vitality to this right, the fourth amendment must be
liberally construed. 8 2 Not only do these cases do violence to this
command by insisting upon a narrow concept of search, but also,
they defy logic and reason. For example, if officers of the law can
rely upon observations as a valid basis for probable cause to obtain
a warrant, 8 3 then there is no reason why functional observations,
too, may not form the basis of the search process itself.
Mr. Justice Sobel is indeed correct when he states, "Mere observation is never a search.' 18 4 But when observations cease to be
accidental, when they cease to be random, when their function
serves and thereby becomes a part of the search process, they too
are searches and must be so characterized. 8 5 For now, it must
become evident that they are no longer innocuous, non-search activities. Granted, it will not always be easy to distinguish functional from random observation. But this should never deter a
court, for what is at stake here is the continued viability of the
amendment and not simply an exercise in semantics.
180. United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1949).
181. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886); Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 543-45 (1897); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
389-91 (1914); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 36365 (1959); Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property, etc., 367 U.S. 171, 724-29
(1961); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480, 481-85 (1965).
182. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344, 357 (1931); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
183. E.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111, n.4 (1965);
Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1962); United States
v. McCormick, 309 F.2d 367, 372 (7th Cir. 1962); cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 97 (1964); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 530, 532 (1964);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309-10, 313 (1959); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-74 (1949).
184. SOBEL, op. cit. supra note 95, at 71. Also, it has been held that
keeping a suspect under surveillance is not a search. People v. Estrialgo,
37 Misc.2d 264, 233 N.Y.S.2d 558, 579 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 19
App. Div. 2d 509, 245 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (1963), reversal aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d
733, 250 N.Y.S.2d 293, 199 N.E.2d 384 (1964). But this should be true only
so long as the surveillance does not degenerate into a quest for evidence of
crime or guilt.
185. See, for example, People v. Hobbs, 50 Misc.2d 561, 270 N.Y.S.2d
732, 736-37 (1966).
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Finally, there would be no argument with the requirement for
a trespass, if it were not limited to the traditional physical variety.
If the concept of trespass were broadened to include any means
used to commit an unwarranted invasion of the individual's privacy, then the courts will have taken a healthy step forward in
what should be their quest for a growing respect by law enforcement officials for every man's basic constitutional rights.
C. Authorities Holding that Observations, Made by Trespass,
are Searches
The majority of the cases that have refused to characterize
observations as searches have relied upon the open view doctrine.1 16
There are cases, however, that have taken a different approach to
the problem posed by observations. In these cases, the critical
factor is that of trespass. Thus, if a trespassory intrusion is made
into an area protected under the fourth amendment, the fruits of
observation thereby made will be suppressed.' 1 7
The courts that have taken this position are not concerned
with the open view doctrine. 8s Once the officer is where he is not
186. One notable exception is State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 402 P.2d 741,
743 (1965), which placed stronger emphasis upon the absence of a trespass.
The court, in effect, "blended" the absence of a trespass with the open
view doctrine. But there can be no doubt that its denial of the existence of
a search was predicated upon the absence of a trespass. In support of its
decision, it cited United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Smith v. United
States, 2 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1924); People v. Wright, 153 Cal. App.2d 35,
313 P.2d 868 (1957); and People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419, 124 N.W.2d 269
(1963).
While it is true that in all of these cases there was an absence
of a physical intrusion, only Wright expressly based its ruling of nonsearch
upon such absence. 313 P.2d at 870. Undoubtedly, though, such absence
played a role, albeit not explicit, in the rulings of the other cited cases.
187. McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603 (1st Cir. 1955);
Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Simpson v.
United States, 346 F.2d 291, 294 (10th Cir. 1965); Presley v. Pepersack,
228 F. Supp. 95, 104 (D. Md. 1964); Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176
So.2d 840, 855 (1965); State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208, 214
(1965); State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365, 369 (1962); People v.
O'Neill, 14 N.Y.2d 148, 153-54, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420, 182 N.E.2d 95, 98
(1962); People v. Kramer, 38 Misc.2d 889, 239 N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (1963).
188. Consider Barnes v. State, 25 Wis.2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264, 269 (1964),
where the court did not hesitate to rule that the police were engaging in an
illegal search of the person of defendant, even though they were bringing
into open view, by use of a flashlight, incriminating evidence. In fact, the
court expressly ruled that when the officers peered into the interior of
defendant's overcoat with the aid of their flashlight, they were engaging
in a search; 130 N.W.2d at 269. Once again, we see in action the requirement for a trespass, except that here the trespass is being committed upon
the person or body of an individual. It has been expressly held that the
amendment applies to the individual's body or person, as where blood is
forcibly extracted from his body for an alcohol-content test. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
It would seem from Schmerber
and Barnes that the trespass, or physical intrusion requirement is satisfied
by any penetration of the body, or its clothing, including outer as well as
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permitted to be,1 89 then the government may not benefit by what

he observes or hears.190 While not explicitly referring to such observations as searches, there would appear to be no doubt that
these cases consider them to be such; for, in suppressing their
fruits, courts invoked the sanction of the amendment itself.
In rejecting the argument that the fourth amendment applies
only to physical, tangible materials, these courts have reasoned in
this manner:
We find no basis in the cases or in logic for distinguishing
between the introduction into evidence of physical objects
illegally taken and the introduction of testimony concerning objects illegally observed. We are aware of no case
which makes this distinction. Moreover, it seems to us that
the protection afforded by the Constitution against unreasonable search and seizure would be narrowed down to a
virtual nullity by any such view of the law, which in effect
would grant to the victims of unreasonable search and
seizure the rather unsubstantial right to be convicted on
the basis of evidence which was illegally observed rather
than evidence which was illegally taken. 19 1
The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial
physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a
direct result of an unlawful invasion. It follows from our
holding in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, that
the Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more tradiinner garments. Accord, State v. Collins, 150 Conn. 488, 491, 191 A.2d 253,
255 (1963) (a "frisk" is a search); People v. Rodriguez, 47 Misc.2d 551, 262
N.Y.S.2d 859, 864 (Nassau County Ct. 1964) (a "frisk" is a search); Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 421 Pa. 169, 181-82, 218 A.2d 249, 256 (1966) (a
"patting" of defendant's clothes at scene of arrest is a search). Contra,
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 446, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463, 201 N.E.2d 32,
35 (1964), cert. denied, Rivera v. New York, 379 U.S. 978 (1965) (while
involving some invasion of privacy, a "frisk" is not the equivalent of a
search).
189. This has reference not so much to presence as to means of entry.
Thus, an officer would be permitted to be within a constitutionally protected area, if he had gained access in compliance with the requirements
of the amendment. It is only when he enters in noncompliance that he
is not permitted to be there.
190. As to the suppression of statements illegally overheard, see, e.g.,
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963) (relying upon
McGinnis); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961); Barnes
v. State, 25 Wis.2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264, 269; and see also Brock v. United
States, 223 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1955) (it is a violation of both the selfincrimination clause and the fourth amendment for federal agents to go
upon an individual's property, without benefit of a warrant, secrete themselves under his bedroom window, and from this vantage point propound
suggestive questions to him in his sleep, thereby hoping to obtain incriminating answers).
191. McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603 (1st Cir. 1965). The
court apparently overlooked Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465
(1928), where there appears language intimating that the amendment will
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tional seizure of "papers and effects." Similarly, testimony
as to matters observed during an unlawful invasion has
been excluded in order to enforce the basic constitutional
policies ....

Thus, verbal [or visual] evidence which de-

rives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers' action in the present case
is no less the "fruit" of official illegality than the more tangible fruits of an unwarranted intrusion ....

Nor do the

policies underlying the exclusionary rule invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal [and visual]
evidence. Either in terms of deterring lawless conduct by
federal officers .

.

. or of closing the doors of the federal

courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained,
.. . the danger in relaxing the exclusionary rules in the
case of verbal [or visual] evidence would
192 seem too great to
warrant introducing such a distinction.
There is much merit in this approach. Although it still clings
to the requirement of a trespass, it appears to recognize that the
open view doctrine has no valid place in the law of search and
seizure. It says, in effect, if there has been a trespass, then there
has been a search; and without regard to whether what is seen is
in open view or is covered. On the other hand, if there has been
no trespass, then there has been no search. Under this approach,
the open view doctrine is superfluous and irrelevant. While this
approach has broadened the concept of the fruits of an illegal
search, it has, unfortunately, not widened the traditional concept
of search. It acknowledges that observations can be the product
of a search, and it implies that they can be part of the search
process itself. What it cannot, or will not do is to recognize that
observations can be a part of the search process in the absence
of a physical intrusion.
This inability or refusal seems strange when it is considered
that this approach was not deterred by the traditional requirement
of physical or tangible fruits. If the fruits no longer have to be
physical, why must the intrusion still be so? If the purpose of the
amendment is to protect the individual's privacy, 193 then any unwarranted invasion of the same, regardless of the means used,
should be condemned. 19 4 In short, there is no redeeming logic in
discarding one anachronism while retaining the other.
not apply at all to what is seen or heard. Olmstead's dictum would seem
to have been overruled by Wong Sun and Silverman. See also Hoffa v.
United States, 87 Sup. Ct. 408, 413 (1966).
192. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
193. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
27 (1949); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,
587 (1946); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
194. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1961) (concurring

opinion),
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D. Authorities Characterizing Observations,not Accomplished by
Trespass, as Searches
There are very few cases' 11 that have taken the position that
functional observation, unaccompanied by a physical intrusion, is
part of the search process. The few that have, however, do merit
discussion. In each, a flashlight was used by a police officer to
peer into the darkened interior of an automobile, and the issue
raised was whether such use constituted, under the circumstances,
a search for fourth-amendment purposes.
The first of these cases is Pruitt v. State. 96 Here a highway
patrolman stopped defendant's vehicle at about 10:00 P.M., purportedly for a license check. After doing this, and finding the license to be in order, he flashed his light into the rear of the vehicle's interior and saw the top portion of a box or case. Although at that time the patrolman did not know that the case contained wine, he did know that it was of a type usually used to pack
wine. Furthermore, it was marked as a wine container. He then
inspected the contents of the case, determined that they were in
fact wine, and arrested defendant for transporting the same in a
"dry" area.
The patrolman testified that he had no prior information that
defendant was transporting liquor; that he had no arrest warrant;
that defendant was not violating the law in his manner of operation
of his vehicle; that he had no information that defendant was violating the law that would warrant a license check; that it was dark,
and whatever he saw was by the aid of his flashlight; that it was
unnecessary for him to have flashed his light into the back of the
vehicle in order to conduct a license check; and that his purpose in
stopping the vehicle, and looking
into its interior, was to obtain
97
evidence of violations of the law.
In reversing the judgment of conviction, the court reasoned as
follows:
From the testimony adduced in this case, it is clear to us
that the appellant was stopped by the patrolman so that
the patrolman might get evidence of a law violation. [Emphasis is in the original.] Assuming however, that the patrolman did stop appellant to check his driver's license,
then the patrolman had no right to make a search as an incident to this stopping, under the circumstances of this case.
Had he seen the wine visible to his naked eye, lying on the
front seat of the automobile, then the evidence would have
been admissible for it would have been secured without
195. The author has been able to discover only two such cases. Because of this, as well as the importance of the liberal approach they have
taken, he has deemed it advisable to include for analysis State v. Charbonneau, infra, even though the court's opinion is unreported.
196. 389 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Cr. App. 1965).
197. 389 S.W.2d at 475-76.
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the need for a search. The officer would have been witnessing a violation of the law in his presence, just the same
as though appellant had a pistol lying on the seat in plain
view. We think, however, that the search actually started
when the officer shined or flashed the flashlight in the
back of the car. The examination of a licensee's driver's
license does not carry with it the right to search the vehicle. A licensee is not under arrest during this examination period. It is only when he is without a valid license
in his possession that he becomes a law-violator. Here
the appellant had in his possession and presented to the
officer a valid, unexpired driver's license. This finding
18
terminated the patrolman's responsibility in this matter.
Although the opinion does not expressly say so, it would appear
from a fair reading of Pruitt that the patrolman was standing outside of the vehicle when he flashed his light. In the first place, the
court noted that while he "had appellant stopped he flashed his
flashlight into the car. .. ."1"9 Secondly, the opinion is devoid of
any reference to the trespass rule. Certainly, if there had been a
physical trespassory intrusion, it is reasonable to assume that the
court would have made reference to it in its recital of the facts.
The fact that it did not lends support to the thesis that the officer
engaged in no physical intrusion prior to using his flashlight.
Pruitt appears to be the first reported case to have gone on
record in support of the doctrine that characterizes as search functional observation accomplished without benefit of a physical intrusion. It correctly recognized that the search commenced when the
officer directed his light into the interior of the vehicle. And
what prompted this realization was the fact that such use of the
flashlight was totally unrelated to the license check. Here we have
an example of a court properly attaching the requisite importance
to the officer's mental processes. Since it was apparent to the court
that such use of the visual aid was unnecessary for the check, especially for a check that had already been completed, it could only
conclude that the flashlight was being used to conduct a search.
Therefore, the search had to commence with the initial flashing of a
beam of light into the vehicle.
This approach recognizes what the officer is up to, and calls
his activity by its correct name. It exemplifies the broad concept
of search in action, by paying homage to the rule requiring that
the fourth amendment be liberally construed. 20 0 And, it recognizes
that the ancient right to privacy may be invaded by modern inventions that have for their purpose that which the cruder physical intrusion has always had: To penetrate the area of privacy to
198.
199.
200.
United
States,

389 S.W.2d at 476. (Emphasis supplied.)
389 S.W.2d at 475. (Emphasis supplied.)
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); Gouled v.
States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
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uncover evidence of crime. The penetration, and resultant invasion, has been as effectively accomplished in the one instance as in
the other. What is at stake here is the right to privacy. It matters
not what form the invasion takes. If there has been an invasionan invasion not sanctioned under the law-then, to vindicate the
right, the invasion must be condemned; and with it, its fruits.
Pruitt is a striking example of why so many courts have been
reluctant to characterize functional observation as part of the
search process; for to do so would bring into play all of the protective rules surrounding the law of search and seizure, such as
the requirement of probable cause; the necessity of a valid supporting arrest; the condemnation of the general exploratory search
for evidence of crime; and the disallowance of the sham arrest to
be used as a pretext to conduct a search. Needless to say, in the
usual or typical example presented to the courts, functional observation can never pass muster under any of these protective
rules.
In addition, Pruitt correctly recognized that had the officer
accidentally seen the case of wine while conducting a valid license
check, then the evidence of contraband would have been admissible. 201 This would be nothing more than an example of random
observation in action. As we have seen,20 2 there is nothing impermissible in this. If, however, the purpose of the stop was to
search for evidence of crime, and the license check was seized
upon as a pretext to conduct such a search, then it would seem
that none of the officer's observations could fit the category of
lying
random observation; and this would apply also to 20anything
3
in open view on the front seat of defendant's vehicle.
The last case to be discussed herein is State v. Charbonneau.20 4
In the early hours of the morning two police officers, while on
routine patrol, noticed an automobile parked with its lights on and
its motor running, in the rear of a diner which had already closed.
They proceeded to the vehicle in question, and told defendant, who
was occupying the driver's seat, to step out for a license and registration check. After the check had been completed, and every201. Cf. SOBEL, op. cit. supra note 95, at 120, recognizing that random
observations made after a valid arrest or summons are permissible.
202. See discussion, supra note 176 and accompanying text.
203.

While recognizing that the officer. had stopped the vehicle to con-

duct a general search, the court did predicate its discussion of the open
view doctrine on the assumption that the officer had made the stop for a

valid purpose, namely, to conduct a license check. In short, its discussion
was predicated on the theory that this was the only reason for the stop.
There is nothing in the court's opinion to indicate that it would have invoked the open view doctrine to sanction observations made after a stop to
conduct- a search, even if it be assumed that the contraband was lying in
open view on the front seat. Cf. SOBEL, op. cit. supra note 95, at 120. See
also LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra note 163, at 97.

204. CR.4-10315 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1965) (opinion unreported).
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thing appeared in order, one of the officers ordered defendant to
open the vehicle's trunk. While this officer was checking the contents of the trunk, the other one turned his flashlight, while standing outside, into the interior of the vehicle and discovered a gun.
Although the driver's door had not been closed after defendant
had stepped out, the officer could not see the weapon without the
use of his flashlight. Upon discovery of the weapon, defendant
was formally placed under arrest for possession of the same in a
motor vehicle.
At the suppression hearing, the officers testified that at the
time they first saw defendant's vehicle, they had received no prior
or current complaints about its presence near the diner, or reports
of robberies, current or otherwise, or other criminal activities in
the general area. They stated that the purpose of their inquiry
was to investigate the vehicle's presence, the identity of its occupants, and its ownership.
In suppressing the use of the weapon as evidence at defendant's trial, the court adopted the broad concept of search and conceived of it as including a mere "inspection." From this it reasoned that the officer who employed the flashlight intended to
explore the interior of the vehicle to secure some evidence which
would justify his suspicion of "some wrongdoing or intended wrongdoing, ' 20 5 and would warrant an arrest.

The court, therefore, expressly ruled that in putting the visual
aid to such use, the officer was engaging in a search. In its
Memorandum of Decision, it stated that the officer "purposely
used his flashlight for no other reason than to uncover an [sic]
hidden and concealed weapon."' 20 6 Relying upon the importance of
the officer's mental processes, the court succinctly noted that there
was no question in its mind "that the officer was suspicious of
some wrongdoing or intended wrongdoing and was hoping to
secure some evidence which would justify this suspicion and war20 7
rant an arrest.
Having determined the existence of a search, it now became
the duty of the court to pass upon its legality. It found, however,
that this search was constitutionally deficient for a number of
reasons: The officers had no probable cause20 1 to search the ve205. Ibid.
206. Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
207. Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.) It might be noted that the rule forbidding search on suspicion, e.g., authorities listed in note 76, supra, implicitly recognizes the important role played by the mental processes of
law enforcement officers in the field of search and seizure.
208. Granted, the officers were properly discharging their official duties when they went to investigate the presence of defendant's vehicle at
the rear of the diner in the early hours of the morning. And granted,
further, they were prompted by good intentions. But, as Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959), teaches, good intentions are not enough to
satisfy the requirements demanded for probable cause. Nor is suspicion,
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hicle; they had no warrant to do so, nor was there existing any
emergency that would have justified either a warrantless arrest or
search; there was no consent given by defendant to conduct the
search.
Thus, the court was not concerned with the nonexistence of a
physical intrusion, nor did it intend to permit an apparently valid
license and registration check to degenerate into an exploratory
search for evidence of crime under the guise of a supposedly innocuous use of a visual aid. In short, the court was not prepared
to say that in exposing the "blanket of night," the police did not
effectively expose defendant's privacy to an unwarranted invasion.
The primary merit in Charbonneau,aside from its refusal to be
bound by an outdated concept of trespass, lies in the court's understanding of the important role a law officer's mental processes
play in the law of search and seizure. Once the critical importance
of such processes is recognized, then it becomes, as Charbonneau
teaches, relatively simple to detect the presence of a search. Seen
in proper perspective, functional observation is not something distinguishable from search.
CONCLUSION

The history of search and seizure reveals a never-ending conflict between the security of the individual and methods employed
by law enforcement officers to uncover evidence of crime. This
conflict should never be clouded by hackneyed, tired cliches dealing
with the rights and protection of society vis-A-vis the rights and
protection of the individual. 0 9 The rights of society are those of
the individual, and the rights of the individual are, indeed, those
of society. We must always recall the historic words of the Preamble to the Constitution: "We the People . . do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America."
The rights protected under the fourth amendment are an integral part of "a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties. '210 As such, they are "central to enjoyment of the other
guarantees in the Bill of Rights ' 211 and, consequently, must be
assigned "a place second to none in the Bill of Rights. '212 These
rights belong to all of us-to "We the People." To strike at these
rights secured to the individual is to strike at the same rights seor "strong reason to suspect," enough. 361 U.S. at 101, 104; Brinegar v.

United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1,
5, 6 (1932); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).

209. For an example of such rhetoric, see People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d

441, 447, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463, 464, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35, 36 (1964), cert.
denied, Rivera v. New York, 379 U.S. 978 (1965).
210. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
211. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 163 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
212. Id. at 157.
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cured to "the People." 213
In order for the fourth amendment to enjoy continued vitality, it must be liberally construed. To accomplish this, the concept
of search must be broadly conceived. As one scholar recently said:
[T] he Fourth Amendment did not merely protect against
actual searches, but also against other procedures, or figurative searches, which sought to accomplish the objects of
a search without
affording the constitutional safeguards
21 4
surrounding it.

This has been the position taken in this article. The amendment is no longer concerned exclusively with the privacy of the
home. 215 It is concerned with any unwarranted invasion of the
individual's privacy, regardless of the means employed. As these
means have become more varied, as they have become more sophisticated, so, too, have they come to pose a new threat to the security
guaranteed to all of us under the fourth amendment. Unless a
court is prepared to abdicate its position of guardian of basic constitutional rights, it cannot afford to ignore or overlook such means
-means that in some instances have been newly discovered or
refined.
And this brings us again, as we started, to the role of trespass
in the law of search and seizure. To prevent this role from becoming an anachronistic hindrance to the continued vitality of the
amendment, one of two changes will have to be judicially effected. Either the concept of trespass will have to be broadened to
include any intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, accomplished by physical means or otherwise, or else the requirement
itself for the traditional type of trespass will have to be dispensed
with. To permit its traditional concept to effectively exempt search
activity, as typified by functional observation, from the ambit of
the amendment, is to pose a clear and present danger to any democratic society. This has been the position taken by Mr. Justice
Douglas in the field of search by electronic eavesdropping. 2 6 This,
213. Note the very language of the amendment itself: "The right of
the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
214. LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra note 163, at 52-53.
215. Even when originally enacted, the amendment's basic purpose
was to secure the individual's privacy. In order to effectively accomplish
this, the amendment had to extend beyond the home. E.g., Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33
(1963); State v.Fahy, 149 Conn. 577, 586, 183 A.2d 256, 261 (1962), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 92 (1963); Mascolo, supra note 124 at 384-87; cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
216. See Silverman v.United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1961) (concurring opinion). In this regard, ifindiscriminate eavesdropping can effectively destroy the individual's right to privacy, e.g., Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (concurring opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Warren); People v. Grossman, 45 Misc.2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276-77
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too, is the position a court should take in the field of search by
functional observation.
Not only would this broader concept of the search process protect the fourth-amendment rights of each and every member of
American society, but, also, it would not unduly hinder effective
law enforcement. Just as law enforcement officers have had to
live with the exclusionary rule, without thereby being rendered
ineffective,217 so too can they effectively live with a concept that
brings functional observation within the orbit of search. But even
if some impairment of law enforcement be conceded, it is a small
loss to society in comparison with the preservation of the values
embodied in the amendment. Simply stated, this approach demands that the protective rules of the amendment surround all
search activity. 218

It will leave the officer all benefits to be de-

rived from random, non-search observations. It will protect society
from unwarranted invasion of privacy guaranteed to each of its
members. This would seem not too high a price to pay.
Finally, the need to recognize functional observation as an integral part of the search process, a part that is activated by the
most critical factor in any search, the mental processes of the
searcher, is most apparent in the case of the automobile. As society breaks away more and more from the traditional confines of
the home, as it becomes increasingly mobile, so too will its need for
the automobile grow. We have already become critically dependent upon the automobile in our daily living habits. In fact, it
has become an integral way of life for most Americans. It has
become our home away from home-the twentieth-century man's
castle. It may be that "there is far less invasion of privacy in the
search of an automobile, the interior of which is plainly visible,
than in the search of a private dwelling. 21 9 But invasion, never(1965), then it would seem that indiscriminate observation could also have
the same effect.
217. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960). While the exclusionary rule may have worked on occasion to effectively terminate a
prosecution, it has not released to wrongdoers the profits or implements of
their trade. As is well known, contraband illegally seized will not be
returned to its claimant, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951);
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948), overruled on another
point, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950); nor will the
fruits or implements of crime. United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp.
256, 272 (E.D. Pa. 1966), and authorities cited therein.
218. It may be true that not "every confrontation between an officer
and a citizen is illegal per se, simply because it may be termed a 'search.'"
People v. Hobbs, 50 Misc.2d 561, 270 N.Y.S.2d 732, 736 (1966). But if it is
termed a "search," then it had better meet the standards required by the
fourth amendment. If not, then indeed, such a confrontation will be
stamped with the imprimatur of illegality.
219. LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra note 163, at 91. While the courts have
said that what is an unreasonable search of a dwelling may not be so in
the case of a motor vehicle, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
366-67 (1964); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 208 Pa. Super. 323, 329, 222
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theless, there is. And it is the function of the amendment to protect against all unwarranted invasions of constitutionally protected
areas. As the Supreme Court itself so recently said:
What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a
man relies upon when he places himself or his property
within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or
his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is
protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And
when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in his desk
drawer, or in his pocket, [or brings something into the protected area and leaves it covered or uncovered,] he has the
right to know it will be secure
from an unreasonable search
220
or an unreasonable seizure."
This can best be accomplished in the twentieth century by extending the concept of search to embrace functional observation.
The concept of human liberty and dignity that is expressed in the
fourth amendment 221 would seem to be broad enough to accomplish
this.

A.2d 495, 498 (1966), this has reference only to a relaxation of the requirement of a search warrant on the grounds of practicality.

of a motor vehicle will still require probable cause.

A valid search

Henry v. United

States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959). In short, law enforcement officers may
not legally stop and search a motor vehicle on mere suspicion, see Brinegar

v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267

U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925); Brown v. State, 62 So.2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1952),
which of course does not measure up to the standards of probable cause.
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at 100-02. Is the interior of an automobile always so "plainly visible?" Law enforcement experience would
seem to indicate the contrary. Furthermore, it is not the visability that is
the critical factor in a search. That designation is reserved to two other
factors: the existence of a search, and the consequent invasion of privacy.
220. Hoffa v. United States, 87 Sup. Ct. 408, 413 (1966).
(Emphasis

supplied.) See also United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948)
(simply entering an automobile does not destroy immunities guaranteed
under the amendment).
221. As Professor Landynski so eloquently put it:
In a very real sense, the Fourth Amendment embodies a spiritual
concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person
and to afford it constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that this
privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social
need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.
LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra note 163, at 47. (Emphasis supplied.)
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